"SOME KIND OF HEARING"*
HENRY

J.

FRIENDLYt

It was particularly affecting to be invited to give the Owen J.
Roberts lecture at this law school, of which my father-in-law,
Chief Justice Horace Stern of Pennsylvania, was a distinguished
graduate, a part-time teacher and a long-time trustee. The
honor accorded me is even greater in that this is the hundredth
anniversary of Justice Roberts' birth. Although I did not have
the good fortune to know the Justice more than casually, I accept the eloquent characterization by Chief Justice Stern who
knew him so well:
With Owen Roberts integrity was never a problem but
an instinct. He was utterly devoid of arrogance, of pretension, of intrigue, of corroding ambitions. He was
modest and simple, as all truly great men are modest
and simple, and his lovely, radiant smile was the outward expression of the warm friendliness in his heart.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

My rather enigmatic title, "Some Kind of Hearing," is drawn
from an opinion by Mr. Justice White rendered not quite a year
ago. He stated, "The Court has consistently held that some kind
of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally
deprived of his property interests."2 The Court went on to hold
that the same not altogether pellucid requirement prevailed
where the deprivation was of liberty.
Despite the efforts by some of the Justices to find roots for
so broad a constitutional principle deep in the past, 3 these had
produced only a few Supreme Court constitutional decisions
* This article is an expansion of the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture delivered at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School on April 3, 1975.
tJudge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. LL.B. Harvard
University, 1927.
The writer is more than ordinarily indebted to his law clerks, Gregory K. Palm, J.D.
Harvard University, 1974, and James R. Smoot, J.D. Yale University, 1974, for their help
in preparing this lecture.
3 U. PA. L. ALUMNI NEws, June 1958, at 3.
2 Wolff v.McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974).
Id. (citing, e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914) (taking of private property)).
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with respect to executive or administrative action until Goldberg
v. Kelly4 in 1970. Since then we have witnessed a due process
explosion in which the Court has carried the hearing requirement from one new area of government action to another, an
explosion which gives rise to many questions of major importance to our society. Should the executive be placed in a position
where it can take no action affecting a citizen without a hearing?
When a hearing is required, what kind of hearing must it be?
Specifically, how closely must it conform to the judicial model?
For a long time we had labored under the illusion that the
two latter questions could be answered rather easily. We needed
only to determine whether the issue was one of adjudicative or
of legislative fact. If the former, a full trial-type hearing was
5
demanded; if the latter, something substantially less would do.
Although this approach is useful in many circumstances, it is
only an approach. Moreover, it suffers from several significant
defects. For one thing it does not indicate very accurately how to
determine which issues are adjudicative and which are legislative. 6 For another, with the vast increase in the number and
types of hearings required in all areas in which the government
and the individual interact, common sense dictates that we must
do with less than full trial-type hearings even on what are clearly
adjudicative issues. By contrast, more than mere notice and
comment procedures may sometimes be desirable and even constitutionally necessary on subjects that conceptually would be regarded as rulemaking.
4 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
5 "Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities, businesses,
and properties ....
Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are
general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." 1
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02, at 413 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
DAVIS]. This distinction stems from the opposite results in Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S.
373 (1908), and Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915),
and was first developed by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis in an article, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REV. 364, 402-16 (1942), later
set forth in DAVIS, sUpra, § 7.04, at 420-26.
' The classifying test-that adjudicative facts "are intrinsically the kind of facts that
ordinarily ought not to be determined without giving the parties a chance to know and to
meet any evidence that may be unfavorable to them," DAVIS, supra note 5, § 7.02, at 413,
is somewhat circular and not always satisfactory. See Nathanson, Book Review, 70 YALE
L.J. 1210, 1211 (1961). Professor Davis himself recognizes the existence of a "borderland" area between these broad categories where "the distinction often has little or no
ttility." DAVIS, supra note 5, § 7.02, at 414 (citing New York Water Serv. Corp. v. Water
Power & Control Commn'n, 283 N.Y. 23, 27 N.E.2d 221 (1940). See also DAVIS, supra note
5, § 15.00, at 520-21 n.43, § 15.03, at 529 (Supp. 1970).
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Although some may regret the loss of the old simplicity, its
passing is all to the good. In an early opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who had been a great administrative law teacher, explained that differences in the origin and function of administrative agencies "preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of
procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history
and experience of courts."'7 Despite this wise observation, the
tendency to judicialize administrative procedures has grown
apace in the United States. 8 English judges and scholars consider
that we have simply gone mad in this respect. Lord Diplock, who
headed the English administrative law "team" in a 1969 exchange of views in which I participated, 9 is reported to have said
that the main value of the enterprise from the English standpoint had been to observe the horrible American examples of
over-judicialization of administrative procedures and undue extension of judicial review, and to learn not to do likewise.' 0 The
7 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940). Lord Shaw had said
almost twenty-five years before: "[T]hat the judiciary should presume to impose its own
methods on administrative or executive officers is a usurpation. And the assumption that
the methods of natural justice are ex necessitate those of Courts of justice is wholly
unfounded." Local Gov't Bd. v. Arlidge, [1915] A.C. 120, 138 (1914).
8 This trend is symbolized by the ultimately successful effort of the "examiners" in
the federal agencies, a title eminently appropriate to the administrative function as originally conceived, to be yclept "administrative law judges."
9 The exchange resulted in a splendid book, B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL
CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

(1972) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ & WADE], from which I have drawn heavily.
10 Despite their professed aversion tojudicialization, our English friends consider the
principle audi alteram parten to be one of the two elements of "natural justice," the other
being the right to an unbiased decisionmaker, see Board of Educ. v. Rice, [1911] A.C.
179; H. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 171-218 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as WADE],
even tracing its origin back to Genesis, Rex v. University of Cambridge, I Str. 557, 568
(1723). Moreover, unlike "due process" which can be invoked only when the government
is somehow involved in the alleged abridgment of an individual's rights, see, e.g., Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974), the concept of natural justice affects other
areas of British society, to the extent of regulating the course of dealing between individuals in situations that Americans would generally regard as private. See, e.g.,
Labouchere v. Earl of Wharncliffe, 13 Ch. D. 346 (1879) (resolution of a club expelling a
member was without force since adopted without notice of the precise charge and a full
inquiry); W. ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 227-30 (2d ed. 1947) (discussing application of the principle to clubs, trade unions and various other voluntary associations). In that regard it is similar to, although broader in scope than, the common law
principle recognized in the United States that public policy may require certain private
associations "to refrain from arbitrary action" with respect to the admission, disciplining,
or expulsion of members; "the association's action must be both substantively rational
and procedurally fair." Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541,
550, 526 P.2d 253, 260, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 252 (1974) (en banc). See, e.g., James v.
Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944) ("Where a union has...
attained a monopoly of the supply of labor . . . such a union occupies a quasi public
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matter, however, is not that clear. Professor Davis was undoubtedly right when he observed in 1970, "The best answer to the
overall question of whether we want more judicialization or less
is probably that we need more in some contexts and less in other
contexts.""1
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE HEARING REQUIREMENT
A brief survey of the historical development of the hearing
requirement, both statutory and constitutional, may be useful
before engaging in analysis of that requirement's content.
The term "hearing," like 'jurisdiction," is "a verbal coat of
too many colors."'1 2 Professor Davis has defined it as "any oral
proceeding before a tribunal.' 3 Broad as that definition is, it
may not be broad enough. Although the term "hearing" has an
oral connotation, I see no reason why in some circumstances a
"hearing" may not be had on written materials only.' 4 In addition the term "tribunal" is hardly apt to convey the notion that
hearing requirements may be applied to bodies as diverse as an
position ... and has certain corresponding obligations. It may no longer claim the same
freedom from legal restraint [to choose its members] enjoyed by golf clubs or fraternal
organizations"; union's policy of excluding blacks from full membership invalidated);
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961). See
generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993,
1014-20 (1930). The precise content of the common law "fair procedure" requirement is
far more flexible than that which the Supreme Court has found to be mandated by due
process where it has found sufficient state action. Compare the procedures considered
necessary in Goldberg v.Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), with Justice Tobriner's statement in
Pinsker:
The common law requirement of a fair procedure does not compel formal
proceedings with all the embellishments of a court trial ... nor adherence to a
single mode of process. It may be satisfied by any one of a variety of procedures
which afford a fair opportunity for an applicant to present his position. As such,
this court should not attempt to fix a rigid procedure that must invariably be
observed. Instead, the associations themselves should retain the initial and primary responsibility for devising method which provides an applicant adequate
notice of the "charges" against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond.
12 Cal. 3d at 555, 526 P.2d at 263-64, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56 (citations omitted).
11DAVIS, supra note 5, § 1.04-9, at 34 (Supp. 1970).
12 United States v. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 39 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Compare Mr. Justice Rehnquist's remark, "[t]he term 'hearing' in its legal
context undoubtedly has a host of meanings." United States v. Florida East Coast Ry.,
410 U.S. 224, 239 (1973). See DAVIS, supra note 5, § 6.05, at 375.
13DAVIS, supra note 5, § 7.01, at 407.
14 Professor Davis seems to take a contrary view in the context of the Administrative

Procedure Act, id. § 7.01, at 310-11 (Supp. 1970). However, § 7(d) of the Act, 5 U.S.C. §
556(d) (1970), sanctions the use of only written materials in 'some types of
"hearings"--rulemaking, or determining claims for money or benefits, or applications for
initial licenses-"when a party will not be prejudiced thereby." In any event my discussion is not limited to the APA.
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administrative law judge on the one hand or a city council on the
other. 15 The purpose of the hearing may range from the determination of a specific past event--did a government employee
steal $50?-to an endeavor to ascertain community feeling about
a proposed change in zoning or to determine the efficacy of a
new drug.
The first great federal regulatory statute, the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887,16 made sparing use of the term
"hearing.' 7 The general charter of the Commission, section 15,
used the language, "if in any case in which an investigation shall
be made by said Commission it shall be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the Commission, either by the testimony of witnesses or other evidence."' 8 However, in proceedings in the circuit
courts with respect to violations of the Act or refusals to obey an
order of the Commission under section 15, the report of the
Commission was regarded as merely prima facie evidence of the
facts, which might be rebutted by the defendant.' 9 It was only in
1906, when the Hepburn Act greatly increased the powers of the
Commission, that section 15 was altered to require a "full
hearing, ' 20 apparently in line with what had become Commission practice. 2 ' Shortly thereafter, Mr. Justice Lamar, speaking
22
for the Supreme Court in the well-known Louisville & Nashville
case, said that this requirement, even in a proceeding relating to
future rates,
conferred the privilege of introducing testimony, and at
the same time imposed the duty of deciding in accordance with the facts proved. .

.

. All parties must be

15This was the situation in one of the leading early cases, Londoner v. Denver, 210
U.S. 373 (1908).
16 Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. See generally R.

CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY

COM MISSIONS 37-64 (1941).

17 With respect to the inquiries to be engaged in by the Commission the term appeared only in a sentence in § 17 disqualifying a Commissioner from participating "in
any hearing or proceeding" in which he had a pecuniary interest. Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 17, 24 Stat. 385-86.
18 Id. at 384. To a similar effect the famous long-and-short haul clause permitted a
dispensation "after investigation by the Commission." Id. § 4, at 380.
19See id. § 16, at 384-85.
20 Ch. 1, § 15, 34 Stat. 589.
21 Judge Cooley, former Chief Justice of Michigan, who was appointed as the first
chairman of the ICC, "is often cited as being responsible for turning the ICC into a quasijudicial body and for providing a precedent which future commissions have followed."
M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS 34 (1955). See
generally 1-4 ICC ANN. REP. (1888-9 1) (summary histories of proceedings).
22

ICC v. Louisville & N. R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
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fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and must be given opportunity to crossand to offer
examine witnesses, to inspect documents
23
evidence in explanation or rebuttal.
Scores of later federal statutes adopted the "hearing" language of the Hepburn Act, sometimes retaining the adjective
"full," sometimes not. So far as action under such statutes was
concerned, it was immaterial for many years whether Mr. Justice
or
Lamar and his colleagues were simply construing a statute
24
were acting under the force of the Constitution as well.
Meanwhile, federal agencies became busily engaged in
rulemaking, and until enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act 25 (APA) in 1946, they generally were permitted to do
this in whatever manner they chose. 2 6 Even with the passage of
the APA, only notice and comment procedures that fell far short
of those described by Mr. Justice Lamar were prescribed for
most agency rulemaking. 27 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court
held in a subsequent case a rule made in compliance with these
limited procedures could justify dismissal, without hearing of an
application that would otherwise have required a "full hearing. ' '28 The APA prescribed trial-type procedures only "when
rules are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing. ' 29 When the question of the
scope of this exception finally reached the Supreme Court in
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.30 and United States v.
Florida East Coast Railway Co.,31 not only was the exception given
a narrow construction but the opinions (particularly the one in
231d. at 91, 93.
24The same comment applies to Mr. Justice Holmes' statement in United States v.
Baltimore & 0. S. R.R., 266 U.S. 14, 20 (1912), cited in ICC v. Louisville & N. R.R., 227
U.S. 88, 94 (1913). However, Mr. Justices Holmes' reliance on Washington ex rel. Oregon
R.R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 525 (1912), an appeal from a state court,
would indicate a belief that due process was implicated.
25 Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970).
26 However, enabling legislation often contained specific requirements for rulemaking procedures, such as requiring that a "hearing" be provided. Even then statutes
requiring a hearing were often interpreted to mean public meetings or arguments, and
not trials. See, e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
27 Administrative Procedure Act § 4, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 238 (1948), as amended, 5
U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
28 United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
29 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
30 406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972).

31410 U.S. 224, 239 (1973).
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FloridaEast Coast) opened wide and unexpected vistas for the use
of less than full trial-type hearing procedures in business and
social regulation.

32

On the other hand, the number of nonregulatory areas in
which the Court has insisted on hearings has mushroomed; indeed, we have witnessed a greater expansion of procedural due
process in the last five years than in the entire period since
ratification of the Constitution. Understandably, the first stirrings were in reaction to the outrages stemming from the activities of Senator Joseph McCarthy. The Court invalidated inclusion of an organization on the Attorney General's subversive
list and denial of a security clearance without an opportunity to
be heard.33 After a turn in the other direction by a 5-4 vote in
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 34 in which the
interest involved was deemed insufficient to trigger the constitutional right to a hearing, the trial-type hearing forces scored a
35
resounding victory in Goldberg v. Kelly.
Goldberg has had considerable progeny in the Supreme
Court and a much larger brood in the lower courts. Drawing also
on a pre-Goldberg decision concerning a Wisconsin garnishment
law, 3 6 the Court next struck down a Georgia statute which had
provided for the suspension of the registration and driver's
license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident when
the administrative hearing prior to suspension excluded any
consideration of fault or responsibility but the statutory scheme
made "liability an important factor in the State's determination
....

Fuentes v. Shevin38 invalidated statutes permitting a con-

2

' See text accompanying notes 187-242 infra.
33Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). The Court, however, was still proceeding very cautiously.
Only four of the five-man majority (each writing his own opinion) in theJoint Anti-Fascist
case placed their decisions on constitutional grounds. Greene took the form of a decision
that Congress and the President had not intended to dispense with a hearing.
31Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
35397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that due process requires an adequate hearing
-including notice and the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
to present oral arguments, and to obtain counsel-before welfare benefits can be terminated even for a brief interval). A step on the road to Goldberg was Willner v. Committee
on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (denial of admission to the bar). This had
been presaged long before by Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123

(1926).
36Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Although this case and
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), involved action by court employees, the difference
does not seem significant.
37Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971).
38 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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ditional seller to utilize court process for repossession of chattels without a preliminary hearing. Hearings of a considerable
degree of formality also have been held to be required for revocation of parole 39 or probation. 40 On the day of its parole revocation decision, the Court held that a teacher at a public institution may not be dismissed without a hearing if he had a tenure
or its reasonable facsimile or the dismissal involved a stigma
41
that would impair his ability to obtain future employment.
The 1973 Term seemed to indicate some turning back.
Fuentes was greatly narrowed-indeed, as thought by five members of the Court, including its author, overruled. 42 A badly
divided Court held that a nonprobationary federal employee was
not entitled to a hearing prior to removal from the service if he
were given one later. 43 Perhaps most important of all, the Court
rendered the decision whence the title of this lecture has been
taken, 44 which, although asserting a broad scope for the requirement of "some kind of hearing" in matters of prison discipline, evinced a willingness to accept much less than the full
judicial model for the determination of adjudicative facts when
there was sufficient reason for doing so.
However, the most recent decisions of the 1974 Term show
a resumption of the trend toward greater and greater insistence
on hearings. As Mr. Justice Stewart observed, his own report of
Fuentes' demise proved to be greatly exaggerated. 45 In Goss v.
Lopez 46 the Court pushed the requirement of "some kind of
hearing" into an area entirely new for it-a ten-day suspension
from a public high school. A month later, in Wood v. Strickland,4 7
a case that had been argued on the same day as Goss and the
result in which must have been known when Goss was decided,
39 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
10 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
41Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972).
42 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), noted in The Supreme Court, 1973

Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 40, 72 (1974). Mr. Justice Powell, who joined the five-man
majority, considered that only the Fuentes opinion, rather than its holding, had been
overruled, 416 U.S. at 623-24 (Powell, J., concurring).
13 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), noted in The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88
HARV. L. REv. 40, 83 (1974).
Wolff
W' v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
45 See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719, 723 (1975) (concurring opinion).
46 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
47 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975).
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the Court drove the knife deeper by holding that the Civil Rights
Act 4 8 imposed civil liability on school authorities (including
school board members) who made sufficiently wrong guesses
concerning students' constitutional rights, presumably including
procedural ones. 49 Particularly after Goss v. Lopez it becomes pertinent to ask whether government can do anything to a citizen
without affording him "some kind of hearing. ' 50 The developments of the last five years, and the ebb and flow in the Court's
decisions, make this an appropriate time for the tour d'horizon
attempted here.
III.

WHEN IS A HEARING NECESSARY?

Good sense would suggest that there must be some floor
below which no hearing of any sort is required. One wonders
whether even the most outspoken of the Justices would require
one on the complaint of an AFDC recipient, recounted by Professor Bernard Schwartz, that "I didn't receive one housedress,
underwears .... They gave me two underwears for $14.10... it
should have been $17.60 instead of $14.10. ' '51 Although the value
48 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).

49 In the Court's words the holding was

that a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under §
1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within
his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student.
95 S. Ct. at 1001. See also id. at 1004 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
50 While Mr. Justice White's opinion for a five-man majority in Goss reads blandly
enough, it suffers from the vice, well documented in Mr. Justice Powell's dissent, of
containing no limiting principle. Id. at 1003. Although the suspensions there at issue
were for ten days, the maximum which Ohio permitted without a hearing, emanations of
the opinion go well beyond this. For all that appears, a hearing may be required for a
suspension of two days-or perhaps even two hours-at least when the sanction is noted
on the student's record.
51 SCHWARTZ & WADE, supra note 9, at 123. The quoted remarks were made by an
AFDC recipient who was complaining that the special welfare grant she had received was
less than the full grant for which she had applied. See also Baum, Mass Administrative
Justice: AFDC Fair Hearings 52-53 (paper presented at ABA Section of Administrative
Law, Center for Administrative Justice, Conference June 4-6, 1973).
The lengthy procedures now required with respect to reductions in, or denials of,
special benefits to AFDC recipients are principally the result of federal regulations and
state "fair hearing" statutes. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1973); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358.16
(1974) (prescribing details of fair hearing in New York). See also id. §§ 358.4(a)-(c) (1974)
(hearing protection for recipients of food stamps, cash assistance benefits, and social
services). However, given the expressed dissatisfaction of state officials with federal hearing requirements, see Baum, supra, at 25, 32-38 and the recent loosening of the federal
regulations, see Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 859, 936-39
(1974), it is quite possible that state "fair hearing" statutes and regulations will be limited,
thereby provoking a constitutional battle.
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of even small benefits should not be deprecated, given the precarious financial condition of the recipients of AFDC, the cost of
providing an evidentiary hearing in such a case must so far outweigh the likelihood or the value of more accurate determinations that final reliance should be placed on the informed good
faith of program administrators. Until recently one would have
52
thought there was also a floor with respect to school discipline,
but Goss v. Lopez seems to permit dispensing with a "rudimentary
hearing" only in the case of "[s]tudents whose presence poses a
continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat
of disrupting the academic process .. .
It should be realized that procedural requirements entail the
expenditure of limited resources, that at some point the benefit
to individuals from an additional safeguard is substantially outweighed by the cost of providing such protection, and that the
expense of protecting those likely to be found undeserving will
probably come out of the pockets of the deserving. 5 4 This is
particularly true in an area such as public housing where the
number of qualified applicants greatly exceeds the available
space, so that, from an overall standpoint, the erroneous rejection or even the eviction of one family may mean only that an
equally deserving one will benefit. 55 However, particularly in the
light of Goss v. Lopez, it seems impossible at the moment to predict at what level, if any, the Court will set the floor below which
52 "At some point the sanction becomes a sufficiently innocuous part of the daily
pattern that the adjudicatory character requiring due process becomes imperceptible,
and disciplining the student becomes solely a matter of school or classroom administration. Buss, Procedural Due Processfor School Discipline-Probingthe Constitutional Outline,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 577 (1971).
' 95 S. Ct. at 740. Even in such cases "the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing
should follow as soon as practicable." Id.
54 See Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 282
(1973); Buss, supra note 52, at 574. Some of the potential dimensions of the problem are
reflected by the fact that in 1972 more than 13 million persons received maintenance
assistance tinder the federal government's various categorical assistance programs, at a
cost of about $10.5 billion. By far the most significant category was Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) which numbered about 10.5 million persons as recipients
and cost approximately $6.5 billion. Bautm, supra note 51, at 1. Balanced against the
assistance claimant's interest in receiving a full and fair hearing with respect to any
proposed action affecting his aid is the legitimate interest of the states and federal
government in expunging unqualified recipients from the welfare roles. For example, in
1971 the state of Michigan paid out about S450,000 to recipients awaiting negative action
hearings and the initial decision was reversed in only 8% of a recent sample of such cases.
Id. 32.
" Denial of admission to scarce higher education facilities on the basis of lack of
superior qualifications stands similarly.

1975]

"SOME KIND OF HEARING"

no hearing is needed. Perhaps there is more profit in the inquiry, if a hearing, what kind of hearing, to which I now turn.
IV.

IF

A HEARING, WHAT KIND OF HEARING?

The Court's early opinions on this score were rather vague.
The pioneering case made the rather unilluminating statement,
in the context of a special tax assessment, that while "[m]any
requirements essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be
dispensed with ....[A] hearing in its very essence demands that
he who is entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof,
however informal. ' 56 In his concurring opinion in Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,57 still the finest exposition of
the need for a "hearing," Mr. Justice Frankfurter said only, even
in the case of "a person in jeopardy of serious loss," that one
must be given "notice of the case against him and opportunity to
meet it."'5 8 Favorite adjectives have been "summary," "informal,"
59
"flexible," "effective," "meaningful," and now "rudimentary.
All this sounds like the British concept of "natural justice"
where the classic statement is Lord Loreburn's oft-quoted dictum
concerning the duties of a local school board on a claim of salary
discrimination against teachers in church schools:
I need not add that.., they must act in good faith and
.fairly listen to both sides for that is a duty lying upon
everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they
are bound to treat such a question as though it were a
trial. They have no power to administer an oath, and
need not examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair
opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy
for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement
prejudicial to their view. 60
One must doubt whether it is all that simple, even in England.
Just how are the parties to be given "a fair opportunity . . . for
correcting or contradicting anything prejudicial to their view"?
56Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908).
57341 U.S. 123 (1950).
58

Id. at 171-72.
5'See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 740 (1974); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 566 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-69 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
60 Board of Educ. v. Rice, [1911] A.C. 179, 182.
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In fact, tribunals in England generally permit the calling of witnesses and cross-examination; 61 the apparent informality of the
process derives rather from the character of the tribunal, 62 the
less litigious habits of the English people, and the willingness of
the English courts to abstain from rigid codification.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Local 476 v. McElroy63 has been cited less often for its
holding that no hearing was required than for the statement that
"consideration of what procedures due process may require
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
65
governmental action. 64 I have elaborated a bit on this theme:
The required degree of procedural safeguards varies directly
with the importance of the private interest affected and the need
for and usefulness of the particular safeguard in the given circumstances and inversely with the burden and any other adverse
consequences 66 of affording it. Even amplified in this way, such
a balancing test is uncertain and subjective, 67 but the more
elaborate specification of the relevant factors may help to produce more principled and predictable decisions.
It may be useful to compile one list enumerating factors that
have been considered to be elements of a fair hearing, roughly
in order of priority, and another that arrays various types of
government action that have been urged to call for a hearing,
starting with the most serious. As we go down the second list
from the more severe actions to the less, the needle would point
to fewer and fewer requirements on the list of required
61See, e.g., Osgood v. Nelson, L.R. 5 H.L. 636 (1872) (part of the procedure required
under natural justice); WADE, supra note 10, at 213, 272. However, in some cases courts
have found it proper for the authority to employ confidential sources. In re Pergamon
Press Ltd., [1970] 3 W.L.R. 792 (C.A.); Regina v. Gaming Bd. for Great Britain, [1970] 2
W.L.R. 1009 (C.A.); University of Ceylon v. Fernando, [1960] 1 W.L.R. 223 (P.C.) (accusation against student taking an examination). See WADE, supra note 10, at 210, 218.
62See note 74 infra & accompanying text.
63367 U.S. 886 (1961).
64 Id. at 895. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-71 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring); id. at 186-96 (White, J., concurring); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442
(1960).
65Frost v. Weinberger, No. 74-2020 (2d Cir., Apr. 17, 1975).
66For example, continued receipt of benefits by ineligibles, retention of unqualified
government employees, inability to dislodge a disruptive tenant because neighbors are
afraid to testify, polarizing student-teacher relationships, etc.
67 This was the "burden" of Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Goldberg v.Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 272 (1970).
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safeguards. 68 With the probable exception of Goldberg6 9 itself,
the Court's decisions seem to conform to this scheme. I suggest
also that the elements of a fair hearing should not be considered
separately; if an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally demanded with respect to one item, this may 7afford
0
good reason for diminishing or even eliminating another.
A.

7

Elements of a FairHearing '
1. An Unbiased Tribunal

Although an unbiased tribunal is a necessary element in
every case where a hearing is required, sharp disagreement can
arise over how much in the way of prior participation constitutes bias. 72 In addition, there is wisdom in recognizing that
the further the tribunal is removed from the agency and thus
from any suspicion of bias, the less may be the need for other
procedural safeguards; while all judges must be unbiased, some
may be, or appear to be, more unbiased than others. Instead of
the Goldberg formulation permitting a welfare official (even with
some involvement in the very case) to act as a decisionmaker as
long as he had not "participated in making the determination
under review, '73 but requiring a corresponding heavy dose of
judicialization, agencies might be offered an option of less procedural formality if the decisionmaker were not a member of the
agency and of still less if, as in England, he were not a full-time
government employee at all.7 4 Distrust of the bureaucracy is
68 After I was well along in preparing this lecture, I found that a rather similar
approach had been taken by Professor William Buss with respect to school discipline. See
Buss, supra note 52, at 547. I agree with Professor Buss' approach but, as will be seen,
would give more weight to some negative factors than he does. See id. 579.
69 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See note 35 supra & text accompanying note 245 infra.
7"This point is well developed in Buss, supra note 52, at 639-40.
71 My discussion here will be in terms of constitutional requirements only. Also I
generally assume continued reliance on the adversary system, although with serious
misgivings on that score. See text accompanying notes 115-21 infra.
72 Compare Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 134, 155 & n.21 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.) with
id. at 196 (White, J., dissenting).
73397 U.S. at 271. See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974) (no
constitutional bar to makeup of prison adjustment committee, consisting of Associate
Warden for Custody, Correctional Industries Superintendent and Reception Center Director, to determine whether to revoke good time or impose severe punishment).
74SCHWARTZ & WADE, supra note 9, at 145; WADE, supra note 10, at 257-59. As a rule

tribunals are staffed by independent persons, not by civil servants. A typical tribunal,
especially if it is an appeals tribunal, will consist of three individuals. In many instances
the chairman will be a local practicing attorney who is donating his services on a parttime basis. The other two members will be chosen from among volunteers outside the
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surely one reason for the clamor for adversary proceedings in
the United States. 7 5 But a better answer may not be more insistence on adversary proceedings but less reliance on the bureaucracy for decisionmaking.
2. Notice of the Proposed Action and
the Grounds Asserted for It
It is likewise fundamental that notice be given and that it be
timely and clearly inform the individual of the proposed action
and the grounds for it. 7 6 Otherwise the individual likely would
government. In certain cases the two additional members will represent certain interests
such as employer and employee in the case of National Insurance Tribunals. In some
cases the chairman is paid while the other members regard the work as public service. In
other cases, the panel is composed of individuals with special qualifications and each
member is compensated; for example, Pensions Appeal Tribunals (certain members are
paid physicians). See id. 258-60.
In the United States a particularly strong case for the employment of independent
hearing officers is presented by evictions from private housing constructed with enough
public aid so that evictions constitute government action, in states in which the function
of passing on the justification is not performed by the courts. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d
1236, 1242-43 (4th Cir. 1973) (contrasting South Carolina procedures with those of New
York and North Carolina where evictions in state court are summary in nature and,
therefore, full administrative hearings must be afforded); Caulder v. Durham Housing
Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1002 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971) (North
Carolina); Escalera v. New York Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 853 (1970). Since private housing projects normally do not have access to the state
corps of hearing examiners, hearings in such cases are often conducted by an officer of a
similar project under the management of the same organization, or even by individuals
who were part of the group who initially made the eviction decision. See Wilson v.
Lincoln Redev. Corp., 488 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1973) (a member of the committee that had
voted to evict the tenant and the secretary-treasurer of the housing corporation who had
apprised that committee of "the facts" concerning the tenant may serve on the hearings
panel unless they are required to call on their own personal knowledge in weighing the
evidence); Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 880, 908 (1973). While employment of officers from similar projects seems consistent with Goldberg, Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1974),
would there not be much more confidence if the "tribunal" were, for example, a board of
three retired social workers or one social worker and a tenant and a superintendent from
another similar project? If the nature of the tribunal were thus altered, it should be
permissible to dispense with many procedural safeguards now thought to be required,
which at least cause serious delay and in the case of the confrontation requirement may
prevent the eviction of a fractious tenant because his neighbors are afraid to testify. See
text accompanying notes 83-104 infra.
75 Even by Justices of the Supreme Court, "... when a grave injustice is wreaked on
an individual by the presently powerful federal bureaucracy, it is a matter of concern to
everyone .... " Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 413 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
76 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
at 267-68; Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950). Subsidiary questions are whether the
notice must be written and how long prior to the hearing it must be given. See Holland v.
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be unable to marshal evidence and prepare his case so as to
benefit from any hearing that was provided.7 7 I add, here again,
that the more forthcoming the agency has been in disclosing its
grounds, the stronger should be its position in asking curtailment of other procedures.
3. An Opportunity to Present Reasons Why
the Proposed Action Should Not Be Taken
This also is fundamental. The open question is whether the
opportunity must be for oral presentation. Goldberg held that it
must be in the context of welfare terminations. 78 I have no quar-

rel with that in the situation there presented; but assuming for
the moment that confrontation is not always required, I would
object to requiring oral presentation as a universal rule. Determination whether or not an oral hearing is required should depend on the susceptibility of the particular subject matter to
written presentation, on the ability of the complainant to understand the case against him and to present his arguments effectively in written form, and on the administrative costs.

79

Oliver, 350 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Va. 1972) (written notice of charges one hour before
hearing to prisoner did not afford inmate due process even though he had been orally
informed of the charges three days previously); Stewart v. Jozwiak, 346 F. Supp. 1062,
1064 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (prisoner charged with misconduct is entitled to "reasonable advance notice of such hearing"). Although many courts have concluded that oral notice is
inadequate in some circumstances, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 563-64 (loss of
good time credit and confinement in a disciplinary cell), written notice in all cases is not
constitutionally mandated, and either written or oral notice, at the discretion of the
administrative official, has been permitted in some cases, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct.
729, 740 (1975).
A related question is whether notice, written or oral, must be in a language in which
the intended recipient is fluent. Some commentators have argued that due process demands that so far as administratively feasible, written notice must be in a language which
the recipient can read, Note, El Derecho de Aviso: Due Process and BilingualNotice, 83 YAt.E
L.J. 385 (1973); however, this argument seems not to have been accepted thus far. See,
e.g., Guerro v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
77 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 & n.54 (1967).
78 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
79 In contrast with the mass justice cases, use of written direct testimony by expert
witnesses is common in administrative hearings in the "big case" area and generally is not
the subject of controversy. Allowing such written direct testimony affords great savings in
time and money and often permits relatively complicated ideas, theories, or facts to be
transmitted in a form best suited to complete understanding in situations where the value
of observing demeanor is minimal. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW-CASES AND COMMENTS 860-63 (6th ed. 1974); Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative
Trial-Type Hearingsfor Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 111, 127-28 (1972).
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4, 5, and 6. The Rights To Call Witnesses, To Know the
Evidence Against One, and To Have Decision Based Only
on the Evidence Presented
Although these rights are different, they are so closely associated that it will be convenient to deal with them together.
Under most conditions there does not seem to be any disposition to deny the right to call witnesses, although the tribunal
must be entitled reasonably to limit their number and the scope
of examination. 80 A more debatable issue, which has not recently
been raised in the Supreme Court, is the right to compulsory
process. 8 1 No general rule is appropriate; rather, the alleged

11In the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court has recognized that although the right to present evidence is "basic to a fair hearing," the unrestricted right to call witnesses from among the prison population carries "potential for
disruption and for interference with the swift punishment that in individual cases may be
essential to carrying out the correctional program . . . . Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 566 (1974). Balancing the inmate's interest in avoiding loss of "good time" against
the needs of the prison, the Court concluded that "prison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call
witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit
access to other inmates to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence."
Id. Although the Court then suggested that it would be "useful" for prison officials to
state their reasons for not allowing a particular witness to be called, it refused to mandate
any such requirement as a constitutional matter. While this aspect of Wolff arguably
represents a departure from prior decisions, it is still too early to predict whether it will
have a significant effect in areas other than prison discipline.
The most obvious areas for such application would be those in which there is a
substantial state interest in preserving the overall integrity of institutions and programs,
for example, secondary schools, and there is a substantial chance that the individual may
be more interested in disruption than in proving his case. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729,
740 (1975), would seem consistent with Wolff in this regard, since the Court "stop[ped]
short of construing the Due Process Clause to require, countrywide, that hearings in
connection with short suspensions must afford the student the opportunity to secure
counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge or to call his own
witnesses to verify his version of the incident." As in Wolff it was left to the informed
discretion of the administrative official to determine whether in a particular case any of
these elements of a formal judicial hearing were desirable. However, the Court also
emphasized that it had addressed itself only to the short suspension of ten days or less
and that longer suspengions might require "more formal procedures." Id. at 741. Deep
uncertainty over how "rudimentary" Goss hearings may be is created by the dictum: "Nor
do we put aside the possibility that in unusual situations, although involving only a short
suspension, something more than rudimentary procedures will be required." Id. While
the Court did not put the possibility "aside," the Court neither embraced it nor gave any
clue to what it meant by "unusual." Although this is the kind of remark often inserted in
an opinion in order to forestall a separate concurrence, it would be hard to think of a
sentence better calculated to breed lawsuits or less helpful to the'lower courts in deciding
them.
81 Compulsory process is guaranteed by the sixth amendment only with respect to
criminal trials. Several courts have held that the failure of an administrative adjudication
procedure to provide compulsory process does not violate due process. See Low Wah
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benefits to be derived must be weighed, largely on a case-by-case
basis, against the possible detriments, notably harassment and
delay.
There can likewise be no fair dispute over the right to know
the nature of the evidence on which the administrator relies. But
with this generalization agreement ends. The most debated issue
is the right of confrontation.
Since the only provision in the Bill of Rights conferring the
right of confrontation is limited to criminal cases, one might
think the constitutional right of cross-examination was similarly
confined. However, in Greene v. McElroy, 82 Chief Justice Warren
said that the Court had applied this principle "in all types of
cases where administrative and regulatory actions were under
scrutiny."8 3 Lofty sentiments on this score are usually accom84
panied by references to a passage in the Acts of the Apostles,
ignoring that it referred to a situation where a man was to be
delivered to die, and to Wigmore's statement that crossexamination "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth,"8 5 ignoring that most of the
world's legal systems, which are equally intent on discovering the
truth, have not seen fit to import the engine. 86 Other favorites are characters as diverse as the Emperor Trajan8 7 and Wild
Bill Hickok of Abilene, Kansas, immortalized by President
Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1912) (Immigration and Naturalization Service
hearing); Ubiotica Corp. v. FDA, 427 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1970) (Food and Drug
Administration hearing); cf. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 239-40 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 957 (1963) (parole violation hearing). But see Jewell v. McCann, 95 Ohio St. 191,
116 N.E. 42 (1917).
82 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
83 Id. at 497. In fact none of the decisions cited directly support the right of confrontation as a requirement of due process in such cases under the Constitution. See Reilly v.
Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949); Carter v. Kubler, 320 U.S. 243 (1943); Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937);
Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933).
84 When Festus more than two thousand years ago reported to King Agrippa
that Felix had given him a prisoner named Paul and that the priests and elders
desired to have judgment against Paul, Festus is reported to have stated: "It is
not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is
accused have the accusers face to face, and have licence [sic] to inswer for himself concerning the crime laid against him." Acts 25:16.
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. at 496 n.25.
85 5 J. WIGNOR,
EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourne rev. 1974). See 360 U.S. at 496
n.25.
" See, e.g., Homburger, Functions of Orality in Austrian and American Civil Procedure, 20
BUFF. L. REV. 9, 36 (1970).
87 Quoted in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 552 n.7 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
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Eisenhower. 88 Eloquent statements have been made, notably by
89
Mr. Justice Douglas.
While agreeing that these references were wholly appropriate to the witch-hunts of the McCarthy era 90 and that crossexamination is often useful, one must query their universal applicability to the thousands of hearings on welfare, social security
benefits, housing, prison discipline, education, and the like
which are now held every month9 '-not to speak of hearings on
88 Quoted in Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 372-75 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
89 Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 350-51 (1955) (concurring opinion); Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 180 (1951) (concurring opinion).
" See Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213-14
(1956) (need for confrontation and the dangers of "faceless" informers). For an account
of other similar cases from the McCarthy era, see E. BONTECOU, THE FEDERAL
LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM (1953).
91 In the public welfare area alone there were 1,434,900 applications for public
assistance during the period from January to March 1973. SOCIAL & REHABILITATION
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, APPLICATIONS AND CASE DISPOSITIONS
FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, [January-March 1973] 2 (U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare

Pub. No. (SRS) 74-03109, 1973). Even though only a portion of these applications result
in a full hearing, cf. Baum, supra note 51, at 49 (in a recent period in New York City only
5% of the cases in which benefits were decreased and only 20% of the cases in which a
notice of intent to decrease was sent, resulted in a fair hearing), the burden is clearly
massive. See also SOCIAL & REHABILITATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, FAIR HEARINGS IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE [January-June 1971] (U.S. Dep't of
Health, Educ. & Welfare Pub. No. (SRS) 72-03253, 1971) (46,500 requests for hearings
with respect to welfare claims during six month period); Baum, supra note 51, at 49
(approximately 2,000 requests for fair hearings received by New York City each month).
Similarly, recent statistics concerning the functioning of the social security system
illustrate the enormous increase in the number of administrative hearings being provided
in all areas. In fiscal 1970, 38,480 hearing requests were received; in 1974 the number
increased to 122,793. During those same periods 38,480 hearings were conducted in the
former and 80,779 in the latter. Because of this explosive growth in demand, the pending workload has continued to rise, with 77,501 hearing requests pending on June 30,
1974, and 99,524 cases awaiting hearing on November 9, 1974. Social Security Litigation:
An Inundation, THE THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1974, at 1, col. 2.
The number of hearings that may be required in the public schools in cases of
disciplinary suspensions after Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975), is likewise overwhelming. In an amicus brief filed in Goss the Children's Defense Fund states that at least 10%
of the junior and senior high school students sampled in a five state survey-Arkansas,
Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and South Carolina-conducted by the Office of Civil
Rights of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, were suspended one or
more times in the 1972-73 school year (approximately 20,000 students in New York City,
12,000 in Cleveland, 9,000 in Miami, and 9,000 in Memphis suspended at least once
during 1972-73). An amicus brief submitted by several school associations in Ohio also
indicates that the number of suspensions is very substantial: in 1972-73, 7,352 of 57,000
(12.8%) students were suspended in Akron; 4,054 students ont of a school enrollment of
81,007 (4.9%) were suspended in Cincinnati; and 14,598 of 142,053 (10.3%) students
were suspended in Cleveland. Brief for Buckeye Assoc. of School Adm'rs, Ohio Assoc. of
Secondary School Principals, Ohio Assoc. of Elementary School Principals, et al. as Amici
Curiae. Even these statistics may be somewhat conservative since some schools did not
respond to the survey.
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recondite scientific or economic subjects.9 2 In many such cases
the main effect of cross-examination is delay-an argument not
really answered, as any trial judge will confirm, by the easy suggestion that the hearing officer can curtail cross-examination.
Lawyers, including those who have gone on the bench, have a
vivid recall of the few instances where they destroyed a dishonest
witness on cross-examination and forget those where their
cross-examination confused an honest one or was ineffective or
worse-not to speak of the many cases when they had the good
judgment to say "No questions."
Moreover, effective cross-examination of experts, and of
most other witnesses, would almost inevitably require the aid of
counsel. One wonders how Pedro Perales in his claim for Social
Security disability benefits could have effectively subjected
specialists in neurosurgery, neurology, psychiatry, orthopedics,
and physical medicine to the "ordeal of cross-examination"
vaunted in Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent 93-a task shunned by
most lawyers without special experience and often regarded as
unproductive even by them. Why do we not have the good sense
in such cases to use something like the English medical appeals
tribunal, two of whose members are private physicians,9 4 and
avoid the calling of experts altogether? If "procedures adequate
to determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony
charge," 95 it is equally true that not all procedures required for
the fair trial of a felony charge are needed to dispose of a claim
that may lead to the denial of a disability pension.
The absolutes of Greene v. McElroy96 and of Goldberg v.
Kelly97 with respect to confrontation arguably have now been
ended by Wolff v. McDonnell.98 There the Court considered
whether a prisoner faced with the loss of up to eighteen months
in "good time" credits had a constitutional right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses. It concluded that, in the special
92Even outside the area of mass justice, the prospect of lengthy and hectoring
cross-examination may discourage the appearance of experts before agencies without
subpoena powers. See Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug
Administration, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 1132, 1149 (1972).

93Richardson v.Perales, 402 U.S. 413, 414 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Perales
appears to have had counsel, but the point remains.
'4 See Friendly, Foreword to SCHWARTZ & WADE, supra note 9, at xvi & n.5.
"sBell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971) (Brennan, J.).
96 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
97397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970).
98418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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circumstances of the prison, 99 interest-balancing would dictate a
right to cross-examination only in a most limited range of
cases. 0 0 In other situations, whether to allow cross-examination
was left to the "sound discretion" of the prison authorities.' 0 '
While prisoner cases are doubtless the strongest ones for
dispensing with an absolute requirement of confrontation and
cross-examination, similar arguments (fear of witnesses in coming forward, undue exacerbation, and polarization of what in
some instances must remain on-going relationships) exist in
other situations as well-eviction of tenants from public housing, 10 2 discipline of students, or assignment of students to a class
or school for retarded or disturbed children. The trouble is that
these arguments prove too much. They suggest not only denial
of cross-examination but suppression of the names of the witnesses and consequent serious curtailment of the right to know the
evidence against one-something that should be permitted only
when the penalty is small or the decision is preliminary or if the
dangers of disclosure are exceedingly grave. In other words, the
question whether cross-examination should be denied must generally be viewed from an incremental standpoint-assuming that
the name of the witness and the content of his testimony will
have been disclosed, how much further harm, if any, will be
caused by allowing cross-examination when contrasted with its
03
value.
99 Potential disruption of institutional programs as well as danger to inmate accusers
resulting from resentment persisting after testimony and the concomitant demand for
anonymity by inmate accusers were the special factors discussed by the Court. Id. at
566-72.
100 Id. at 569.
101 Id. In dissent, while arguing vigorously that the right of cross-examination should
be limited only in exceptional cases, Mr. Justice Marshall made the suggestion that even
in such cases the disciplinary board should call the witness before it in camera and itself
probe his credibility. Id. at 590. This might be fruitful in other fields. Cf. Dejesus v.
Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70, 75-76 (D. Conn. 1972) (cross-examination by the tribunal is
possible substitute for cross-examination of adverse witnesses by the party).
'02 Cf. GEORGE SCHERMER ASSOCIATES, MORE THAN SHELTER: SOCIAL NEEDS IN LowAND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSING 40-42, 54-58 (1968). One suggested solution in this
area has been to adopt the balance struck in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972), and to permit the concealment of the identity of complaining tenants whenever,
in the judgment of the independent decisionmaker, revealing it would jeopardize tenant
relationships or present a serious threat of reprisal. See Note, supra note 74, at 906-07.
103 See Buss, supra note 52, at 593-603.

Lower courts have reached different conclusions with respect to whether due process
requires that a claimant have the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
For example, in McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973), the court held that where
untenured non-civil service employees are dismissed on the basis of secret charges which

19751

"SOME KIND OF HEARING"

Some aspects of the doctrine that the administrator must
confine himself to the record are simply another form of what
we have just been considering. But even on a broad view of a
right to confrontation, the principle against use of extra-record
evidence can be pushed too far. In England "a tribunal such as a
rent tribunal is entitled to use its own knowledge and experience, for example, as to the level of rents or the scarcity of
houses in its area.' 0 4 Such matters fit into Professor Davis'
category of "legislative facts,"' 0 5 and notice of them should be
permissible as long as the tribunal clearly indicates the basis for
its decision so that erroneous fact-finding might later be challenged, either on appeal or in subsequent cases.
7. Counsel
The Goldberg opinion quotes the oft-cited statement in Powell
v. Alabama'0 6 that "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel."' 0 7 Apparently no difference was perceived between
a capital case and the suspension of a welfare allowance, except
that in the latter the government was not required to provide
counsel.
To be sure, counsel can often perform useful functions even
in welfare cases or other instances of mass justice; they may
bring out facts ignored by or unknown to the authorities, or help
to work out satisfactory compromises. But this is only one side of
impugn their honesty and integrity, the Government must provide an opportunity for
them to confront and cross-examine such adverse witnesses, absent a specific finding that
the Government has "good cause" to protect its confidential informant with a cloak of
absolute secrecy. See Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Tibbs v. Board of Educ., 59 N.J. 506, 284 A.2d
179 (1971). By contrast, in Carpenter v. City of Greenfield School Dist. No. 6, 358 F.
Supp. 220, 226-27 (E.D. Wis. 1973), the court concluded that, with respect to the dismissal of a teacher, hearsay reports based on interviews with students were permissible as
long as reference was made to specific instances of proscribed conduct except where no
meaningful response was possible. See United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d
701, 715 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Behagen v. Intercollegiate
Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602, 608 (D. Minn. 1972). The
school discipline cases are thoroughly reviewed in Buss, supra note 52, at 551-73. With
respect to due process hearings for retarded children, see Kirp, Buss, & Kuriloff, Legal
Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Reforms, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
40, 79-81 (1974). See also Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
"04 SCHWARTZ & WADE, supra note 9, at 154 (citing Crofton Inv. Trust Ltd. v. Greater
London Rent Comm'n, [1967] 2 Q.B. 955.
105 DAVIS, supra note 1, § 7.06, at 430.
106 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
0 7
1 Id. at 68-69.
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the coin. Under our adversary system the role of counsel is not
to make sure the truth is ascertained but to advance his client's
cause by any ethical means. 10 8 Within the limits of professional
propriety, causing delay and sowing confusion iot only are his
right but may be his duty. The appearance of counsel for the
citizen is likely to lead the government to provide one-or at
least to cause the government's representative to act like one.
The result may be to turn what might have been a short conference leading to an amicable result into a protracted controversy.
Finally, it is usually mere words to talk of "retained" counsel in
welfare cases. When counsel appears, he will almost inevitably
have been provided by an organization supported in large part
by public funds and the government is thus paying the cost as
fully as if counsel were assigned.
It is thus fortunate that subsequent cases have not taken this
portion of Goldberg as an absolute governing other types of hearings. The Supreme Court recognized in Wolff that in the prison
context "[t]he insertion of counsel into the disciplinary process
would inevitably give the proceedings a more adversary cast and
tend to reduce their utility as a means to further correctional
goals."'1 9 The Court thus declined to hold that inmates had a
right either to appointed or even to "retained" counsel, instead
indicating that where an illiterate inmate was involved, or where
the issues were sufficiently complex to make the inmate unable
"to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate
comprehension of the case," he should be permitted to seek the
aid of fellow prisoners, or if that is prohibited, to have "adequate
substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff." 0 This is a
sensible compromise, which may be emulated, mutatis mutandis,
in other contexts, such as student or employee discipline, where
the disadvantages of the presence of counsel may outweigh the
benefits. This portion of the Wolff decision, as well as the caseby-case approach of Gagnon v. Scarpelli l on revocation of
probation,"12 are likely to have considerable anti-Goldberg rever108On this, and the whole subject of tme adversary system, see Judge Frankel's
remarkable Cardozo lecture, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1031 (1975). Passages bearing particularly on the role of the advocate will be found at
1040-43, 1047-48, 1050-55.
109 418 U.S. at 570.
110 Id.
1"
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
12 Id. at 787-91.
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berations. n 3
These problems concerning counsel and confrontation inevitably bring up the question whether we would not do better to
abandon the adversary system in certain areas of mass justice,
notably in the many ramifications of the welfare system, in favor
of one in which an examiner-or administrative law judge if you
will-with no connection with the agency would have the responsibility for developing all the pertinent facts and making a just
decision. Under such a model the "judge" would assume a much
more active role with respect to the course of the hearing; for
example, he would examine the parties, might call his own experts if needed, request that certain types of evidence be presented, and, if necessary, aid the parties in acquiring that
evidence."

4

Many parts of the mass justice area would be particularly
suitable for such an experiment since the guidelines are sufficiently definite to avoid the danger that an outside reviewing
panel might endeavor to remake agency policy. 1 5 Although
questions of fact and policy may inevitably become inter113 Prior to Wolff many lower courts had considered the right-to-counsel question in
the context of student disciplinary proceedings. Although perhaps a majority of these
courts concluded that due process does not incorporate the right to retain counsel, see,
e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967) (as long as the government
does not proceed through counsel); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S.D.W.
Va.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969);
Due v. Florida A & M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963), a substantial
number, particularly since Goldberg, have reached the opposite result. See, e.g., Givens v.
Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277
F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967), afJd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 965 (1970). Most commentators are of the view that there should be a right to retain
counsel, at least in major disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 52, at
605-13; Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1075-76 (1969).
One possible application of Wolff in the school situation might be allowing the school
officials to appoint a staff member to assist the student in the preparation of his defense
in lieu of retaining counsel. Similarly, courts may distinguish between the right to retain
counsel at different levels of the educational process (e.g., secondary school v. college)
based on a difference in the perceived effect on the overall educational process of the
presence of such counsel in disciplinary proceedings. Goss v. Lopez would not seem to
proscribe such experimentation and differentiation since although intimating in dictum
that "more formal procedures" might be required in cases of longer suspension or expulsion, the holding-in the context of a "short suspension"-left it to the informed discretion of the school administrator to determine whether counsel should be permitted in a
particular case. 95 S. Ct. at 740.
14 Cf. B. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD
124 (1954).
115 This would seem to be a serious risk, for example, with regard to the panels for
review of administrative decisions in schools with respect to the placement of retarded
children suggested in Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 103, at 123-25.
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twined, 116 for the most part the tribunals would simply be determining the facts and then applying pertinent statutes and
agency rules or regulations. The hearing boards presumably
would have access to government officials and program administrators for pertinent information concerning agency policies.
While such an experiment would be a sharp break with our
tradition of adversary process, that tradition, which has come
under serious general challenge from a thoughtful and distinguished judge, 1 17 was not formulated for a situation in which
8
many thousands of hearings must be provided each month."
Whoever baptized the continental system as "inquisitorial" did a
disservice to American legal thought." 9 Call it "investigatory"
and the pejorative connotation fades away. Use of the investigatory system should not be viewed as a lessening of protection to
the individual; if properly applied, it could well result in more.
This investigatory model would also have the advantage of being
more informal; the decisionmaker, in a conference-type setting,
would hear the evidence and discuss the dispute with the parties
and with their attorneys, assuming that they were permitted to
20
have them.'
If we are to experiment with the investigatory model anywhere, this is the ideal place to do it. Strongly embedded traditions, specific constitutional limitations, and resistance of the bar
will prevent its use not only in criminal but also, to a lesser
extent, in ordinary civil litigation. There is no constitutional
mandate requiring use of the adversary process in administrative
116 Cf. Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996, 999-1000 (N.D. Cal.), affd sub nom.
Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 924 (1973) (rejecting policy/fact distinction as a basis
whether to require a full evidentiary hearing); Mothers' & Children's Rights Org. v.
Sterrett, 467 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1972) (same).
117 Frankel, supra note 108.
11I See Baum, supra note 51, at 49-50 ("police court" environment created by inadequate staff).
I" Judge Frankel has noted our curious and unfortunate parochialism on this score,
Frankel, supra note 108, at 1043.
120 Critical to the successful implementation of this or indeed of any plan for improving the efficiency of mass justice is the assurance of an adequate supply of skilled hearing
officials. Baum, supra note 51, at 45-47. Although the British example of drawing the
membership of its tribunals in many areas from a pool of citizen volunteers or, in other
areas, of drawing on individuals with special skills to work part time, see note 74 supra,
should be emulated where feasible, given the number of hearings' currently provided it is
likely that most administrative agencies will be dependent upon "professional" decisionmakers for some time. There is thus a need to continue the upgrading of such positions,
both through training and through compensation sufficient to attract capable individuals.
Cf. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 114, at 26-29, 56-57, 86-87 (French National School of
Administration); M. WALINE, TRAITi t9MENDE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 73 (6th ed. 1951).
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hearings unless the Court chooses to construct one out of the
vague contours of the due process clause. But that clause does
not forbid reasonable experimentation. For a state to experiment
with procedures for mass administrative justice wholly different
from those required in a felony trial would be a splendid vindication of "one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory.' 1 21 Alternatively, federal agencies administering various welfare programs might attempt to implement different
forms of nonadversary procedure. Action of this sort would provide controlled experiments in areas where transplantation of
even a diluted form of trial type proceedings is not likely to work
well.
8 and 9.

The Making of a Record and a
Statement of Reasons
I shall treat these two points together since they are closely
associated with judicial review, although a statement of reasons
serves other valuable functions as well.
Professors Schwartz and Wade tell us that "the aspect of
American administrative law that impresses foreigners most unfavourably is the requirement of a formal record in every case
where a hearing is held.' 122 Americans are as addicted to transcripts as they have become to television; the sheer problem of
warehousing these mountains of paper must rival that of storing
atomic wastes. We risk the fate of the eminent professor Fulgence Sapir, in Anatole France's Penguin Island, who boasted that
he had all of art classified on paper slips alphabetically and topically, only to find himself suffocated when his search for one slip
caused all the others to cascade upon him. Except for administrative appeal or judicial review, there would seem to be no
need for any "record" in the typical mass justice case;' 23 the facts
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
SCHWARTZ & WADE, supra note 9, at 132. They cite as an example of the judicial
attitude toward the provision of transcripts a federal case in which at a prior hearing
concerning the validity of the initial denial of a welfare application for a grant of household goods and winter clothing, the referee had refused to provide facilities for transcription of the proceedings. The district court granted an injunction requiring the welfare agency to provide a complete record of the proceedings, without feeling any need to
justify its action in a written opinion. Id. 133 (citing Banner v. Smolenski, CCH Pov.
LAW REP.
10,587 (D. Mass. 1969)).
123 Many lawyers would doubtless argue that knowledge that a transcript is being
made tends to restrain abuses by hearing officers. It is hard to see why unless the
transcripts are read by some higher authority.
121
122
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are simple enough that the hearing officer can render a decision
on the basis of his recollection and notes, as is done in
England.' 2 4 Even administrative appeal or judicial review would
not require a transcript; for centuries appeals were heard on the
judge's notes.125 Very likely, however, we have too little confidence in hearing examiners to allow this. 1 26 Although electronic
recording has recently acquired a bad name in other contexts, in
most cases it surely should be sufficient to use tapes and to
27
transcribe them only if an appeal were taken.'
A written statement of reasons, almost essential if there is to
be judicial review, is desirable on many other grounds. 28 The
necessity for justification is a powerful preventive of wrong
decisions.' 2 9 The requirement also tends to effectuate intraagency uniformity, and would be particularly important in this
regard if the hearing board were composed of individuals drawn
from outside the agency. A statement of reasons may even make
a decision somewhat more acceptable to a losing claimant.
Moreover, the requirement is not burdensome; sometimes it can
even be met by checking a list on a card. 130 For all these reasons
I would put this item close to the top rather than near the bottom of the scale.' 3 1
124 In England since tribunals are often entitled to use their own general knowledge
and experience, see note 104 supra & accompanying text, their decisions, therefore, to not
have to be based "on the record" in the full American sense. If there is an appeal, or an
application for review, on the ground that evidence was lacking concerning some finding
of the tribunal, evidence of what transpired at the proceedings is normally provided by
affidavit of the parties, although in some cases it may be given by direct oral testimony.
See, e.g., Regina v. Board of Control ex parte Rutty, [1956] 2 Q.B. 109.
125See Medina, The TrialJudge's Notes: A Study inJudicial Administration, 49 CORNELL
L.Q. 1, 4 (1963).
126 But cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974) (apparently limiting requirement of a "written record" in prison disciplinary cases to a statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action; not a
verbatim transcript or recording).
127 See SCHWARTZ & WADE, supra note 9, at 133. New York has recently adopted the
California practice of recording welfare hearings on tape.
128 Less clear is the exact detail and scope which the written statement of reasons
must take. Compare Caramico v. Secretary of the Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 509
F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974) (explicit decision of any disputed ground, including a statement
of opposing considerations, that "adequately disposes of the issue"), with Burr v. New
Rochelle Munic. Housing Auth., 479 F.2d 1165, 1170 (2d Cir. 1973) (statement "outlining" reasons for approving or rejecting rent increase). In these days when appellate
courts themselves are being compelled to omit or abbreviate opinions, they should be
careful about imposing unrealistically high requirements upon those who must administer mass justice.
129 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974).
1"' See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 104-05 (1969).
1"1 Although the English courts have refused to include a statement of reasons in the
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10.

Public Attendance

Legal scholars have explained why this guarantee has been
considered a fundamental element of a criminal trial. 1 32 However, this feature of court trials has received relatively slight
emphasis with respect to administrative proceedings. Balancing
the particular interests of the individual and the state concerning
public attendance leads to the conclusion that it is manifestly
inappropriate for certain administrative hearings and that, while
it is arguably desirable in others, due process generally does not
require it. 133
To require an open hearing would be manifestly wrong in
the case of a prison disciplinary proceeding. Beyond the burden
that such a requirement would place on limited prison facilities,
as the Court recognized in Wolff, "[t]he operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking."' 34 Consequently, given the disruptive effect that a public
hearing might have on legitimate institutional interests, prison
officials must be accorded the discretion to keep hearings closed
to the general public and press instead of being subjected "to
unduly crippling constitutional impediments."' 3 5 A more difficult question is whether the prisoner should at least be entitled
to be accompanied by family or friends.
In the area of student disciplinary proceedings, several
lower courts have concluded that procedural due process is not
denied because the hearing was not open to other students, the

concept of natural justice, Regina v. Gaming Board for Great Britain ex parte Benaim &
Khaida, [1970] 2 Q.B. 417, § 12(1) of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2,
c. 66, imposes this duty on tribunals subject to the Act whenever reasons are requested
"on or before the giving or notification of the decision ....
" The courts take this
mandate seriously. See SCHWARTZ & WADF, supra note 9, at 155-56. However, even among
tribunals that are within the Act there are certain exceptions. For example, the Lord
Chancellor may directly order that any class of decisions shall be exempt if he is of the
opinion that the giving of such reasons is unnecessary or impracticable. 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c.
66, § 12(4) (1958).
,32 Three principal reasons are typically cited for the right to an open trial as a part
of due process. First, an open trial fosters confidence. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
1834, at 335 (3d ed. 1940). Second, a public trial will help to assure the accuracy of the
evidence offered. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373. But cf. Radin, The Right to a
Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 384 (1932). Third, the presiding officials will more likely
conduct the proceedings fairly. J. WIGMORE, supra, § 1834, at 335. It has been urged that
these reasons argue in favor of an open administrative hearing in many areas. See Comment, The Right to an Open Administrative Hearing, 53 B.U.L. REv. 899 (1973).
M"See Wright, supra note 113, at 1079-80.
134 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
135 Id. at 566-67.
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press, or the public in general. 13 6 The reasons for allowing
closed hearings are somewhat similar to although here less forceful than those just canvassed. 137 In contrast, at least one court
has concluded that due process requires a hearing on the termination of a government employee to be open.' 38 Arguably the
interest of the public in ensuring that the government functions
fairly and the relatively greater ability of the government to pro13 9
vide for open hearings may support this distinction.
In welfare cases the problem largely solves itself; there is no
good reason to exclude the claimant's family and typically no one
else has any interest in attending. In public and governmentsubsidized housing a much more difficult problem is presented.
A private landlord may not have the facilities to conduct wholly
public hearings or the readily available sanctions and enforcement mechanisms necessary to ensure that the "observers" do
not disrupt the proceedings. Moreover, beyond disrupting the
immediate proceeding, the presence of tenants with sharply
differing views, vocally expressed, may fractionalize the tenant community, a result that likely would be inimical to the
long term viability of the project.' 40 Although tenants in a given
housing project have an interest in ascertaining whether the procedures that test the correctness of evictions, fines, and other
penalties assessed against them by the landlord are fair, the requirement of a statement of reasons should suffice.
11.

Judicial Review
Although I have not researched the state decisions, my impression is that, up to this time, judicial review in the area of
mass justice has largely been limited to questions of fair procedure, and there has been little attempt to obtain review for lack
13'Moore

v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 731 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Zan-

ders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 768 (W.D. La. 1968); cf. Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961).

137 Commentators, students and administrators are often divided on the question
whether particular hearings should be open or closed, and who should have the power to
make that decision. Compare CRISIS AT COLUMBIA: REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING
COMMISSION APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE DISTURBANCES AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN

APRIL AND MAY 1968, 97 (1968), with Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed From Eugene, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 40, 56-57 (1966).
138 Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
139 Cf. Comment, supra note 132, at 915-18.
11"See Note, supra note 74, at 906-07; GEORGE SCHERMER ASSOCIATES, supra note 102,

at 40-42, 54-58.
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of substantial evidence or even for arbitrariness or capriciousness. Would that it may remain so! The spectacle of a new source
of litigation of this magnitude is frightening. Yet many state
administrative procedure acts, not to speak of the supposed
"common law" right of review, would seem to subject determinations of the sort here considered to substantive review. Surely
this is an area where courts should exercise self-restraint; the
agencies can promote this by fair procedures and adequate
statements of reasons, remembering141that one sufficiently outrageous example may burst the dike.
B.

The Nature of the Governmental Action

Now I shall endeavor to make up the other list, ranking the
action proposed to be taken in terms of its seriousness to the
individual. Obviously this survey cannot include every kind of
governmental action; I shall have to limit myself to those that
have surfaced most prominently.
For starters I would draw a distinction between cases in
which government is seeking to take action against the citizen
from those in which it is simply denying a citizen's request. This
is not the discredited right-privilege distinction in another garb.
The first category includes cases where government seeks to
withdraw a "privilege" as well as a "right," if indeed these terms
have any meaning in this context as distinguished from their
42
proper Hohfeldian use.'
Still, one is entitled to ask whether the distinction has real
validity. Even a beginner in mathematics knows that the distance
between two points on the vertical axis is the same whether one
measures down or up. Moreover, there are cases at the top of
the second category whose seriousness is greater than those at
the bottom of the first.' 43 But the distinction has a notable
lineage. The famous Article 39 of Magna Carta, 44 often seen as
14 A classic instance is In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
142

IV.

HOHFELD,

FUNDAMENTAL

LEGAL

CONCEPTIONS

AS

APPLIED

IN JUDICIAL

REASONING 35-50 (W. Cook ed. 1919).
14.3 Thus it was surely more serious for Mr. Willner to be denied admission to the bar
on grounds of character, Willner %.Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96
(1963), or for Mrs. Knauff or Mr. Nezei to be denied reentry to the United States,
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Nezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel.
KnatfT v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), than for a student at a state university to be
suspended for a few weeks.
144 "No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or [and] disseised or exiled or in any
way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judg-
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the origin of the concept of due process, speaks in terms of the
king's going out or sending against a free man, not of his refusing a request. And whatever the mathematics, there is a human
difference between losing what one has and not getting what one
wants. This point is convincingly developed, in the context of
revocation as distinguished from denial of parole, in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Morrissey v. Brewer. 14 5 The distinction is
valid in economic regulation as well. Revocation of a license is far
more serious than denial of an application for one; in the former
instance capital has been expended, investor expectations have
been aroused, and people have been employed.
When we begin to rank cases within the first category, revocation of parole or probation must stand at or near the top.
Deprivation of liberty, even conditional liberty, is the harshest
action the state can take against the individual through the administrative process. The Supreme Court thus was right in demanding a very high level of procedural protection and in setting out the required procedures in detail. 4 6 Civil commitment
47
warrants a similarly high place.'
Decisions involving the treatment of aliens reveal how the
nature of the action affects the sort of "hearing" that is required.
When an alien raises a factual issue regarding deportability, the
Court applies the unusual requirement of "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for
ment of his peers or [and] by the law of the land."

MAGNA CARTA

art. 39, in W. Mc375

KECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN

(2d ed. 1914). See Statute of Westminster, 28 Edw. 3 (1354).
145 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972). The Chief Justice quoted with approval the statement in United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d
Cir.), vacated and remanded with direction to dismiss as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971): "It is not
sophistic to attach greater importance to a person's justifiable reliance in maintaining his
conditional freedom so long as he abides by the condition of his release, than to his mere
anticipation or hope of freedom." See Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278
(5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 809 (1973); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d
403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971) (prisoner is not entitled, under the
fourteenth amendment, to procedural due process rights upon his being interviewed and
considered for parole prior to termination of his sentence). But see Bradford v. Weinstein, No. 73-1751 (4th Cir., Nov. 22, 1974).
146 Arguably deprivation of good time credit ranks close to revocation of probation
or parole. However, the distinctions made by Mr. Justice White in 'Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 560-63 (1974), have much validity. Moreover, the Wolff decision rests
heavily on the special problems of according the full gamut of procedural rights within a
prison. See also Jackson v. Wise, 43 U.S.L.W. 2272 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 10, 1974).
I" Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court). See
generally Developments in the Law---Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190 (1974).
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deportation are true."'1 48 Since the statute 1 49 accords the full
150
gamut of procedural safeguards except assignment of counsel,
the question of constitutional entitlement has not arisen. A much
lower standard prevails when a concededly deportable alien
seeks the discretionary remedy of suspension by the Attorney
General.' 5 ' While such an alien is entitled to a fair judgment by
the decisionmaker, 152 the Supreme Court has held that the Attorney General is not "required to give a hearing with all the
evidence spread upon an open record with respect to the considerations which may bear upon his grant or denial of an application .... ,,53 And although today's Court might not echo the
1950 statement that for an alien seeking admission, "[w]hatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process
.... ,"154 the procedural rights accorded such an alien would not
be many.
Another category ranking high on the procedural scale is
the revocation of a license to practice a profession. Here the
government is threatening to deprive a person of a way of life to
which he has devoted years of preparation and on which he and
his family have come to rely.'5 5 Moreover, the types of issues
often resemble those tried in actions for fraud or negligence, or
even in criminal proceedings. Finally, the number of individuals
involved in such disciplinary action in any given period is likely
to be relatively small, and generally no other special circum56
stances justify a curtailment of procedural safeguards.
148 Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (footnote omitted).
149Immigration & Nationality Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970).
150 The statute does permit the alien to be represented by counsel at the hearing at
his own expense. Id. § 242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (1970).
' See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 490-91 (2d
Cir. 1950). The authority to grant or deny stays of deportation after an entry of a final
order of deportation has been delegated to the district directors of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 243.4
(1973). See, e.g., Fan Wan Keung v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 434 F.2d 301
(2d Cir. 1970); Kladis v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 343 F.2d 513 (7th Cir.
1965); Adame v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 349 F. Supp. 313 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
1-2United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
"'3jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 353 (1956).
154United States ex rel. Knauff v.Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); accord,
Shaughnessy v.United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
155
See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (disbarment); Mack v. Florida State
Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971) (revocation of dentist license).
15 See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra. Closely related to license revocation,
though only an impediment and not a complete obstruction to continuing an established
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We now enter the controversial area of mass justice, still in
the context of government's acting against the individual. The
fields are so diverse that it is impossible to apply any universal
scale of seriousness. However, gradations appear within each
field. Thus a welfare termination is more serious than a reduction; 15 7 suspension of a payment that is the claimant's only hope
for income is more serious than a suspension that permits resort
to other sources of income, even to the welfare system; 1 58 expulsion from public housing is more serious than transfer to a smaller apartment; 159 expulsion from a school is more serious than
suspension or loss of credit; 160 severance from government service is graver than suspension pending a further hearing;' 6 1
dismissal on a ground carrying a moral stigma is more serious
than on one that does not; some types of prison discipline are
more onerous than others.

62

occupation, is debarment from participation in government contracts. Depending on a
variety of factors, including amount of reliance on government work and ability to secure
other customers, such "blacklisting" can cause severe economic consequences and, therefore, calls for procedural safeguards. See Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (Burger, J.).
157 See Frost v. Weinberger, No. 74-2020 (2d Cir., Apr. 17, 1975).
See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 169 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at
201-02 (White, J., concurring & dissenting); Frost v. Weinberger, No. 74-2020 (2d Cir.,
Apr. 17, 1975); Crow v. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev., 490 F.2d 580 (9th
Cir. 1973), vacated and remandedfor considerationof mootness, 95 S. Ct. 1110 (1975) (majority, distinguishing Goldberg based on relative seriousness of loss, held that due process
demands only an informal hearing prior to termination of unemployment benefits); cf.
Torres v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 410 U.S. 971 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Steinberg v. Fusari, 364 F. Supp. 922 (D. Conn. 1973) (three-judge court), vacated, 95 S.
Ct. 533 (1975).
159Cf. Brown v. Housing Auth., 340 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Wis.) (opportunity to challenge reasons for termination of month-to-month tenancy must be given "at a meaningful time" to prevent hardship which will follow the tenant's being obligated to wait until
he is summoned into court at the end of the 30-day period), affd, 471 F.2d 63 (7th Cir.
1972) (without reaching constitutional question).
16"Finer gradations are possible within each subcategory. For example, most courts
had developed distinctions based on the length of the given suspension from school to
determine whether a hearing, and what type, must be provided when students are suspended. See, e.g., Pervis v. LaMarque Indep. School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1972)
(suspension for over three months requires a prior hearing); Linwood v. Board of Educ.,
463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972) (seven-day suspension requires
no hearing). See also Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1077-78 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973). Although Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975),
quite clearly overruled decisions such as Linwood with respect to what length of suspension triggers the need for some type of hearing as a matter of due process, the Court
seems to accept the view that the type of hearing that must be provided is in part
dependent upon the length of the suspension. For an extensive compilation of the often
conflicting lower court decisions in this area, see id. at 737 n.8.
161Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
162 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571-72 n.19 (1974) ("We do not suggest,
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Goldberg v. Kelly16 3 is the lodestar in this area, but it sheds
an uncertain light. After the usual litany that the required hearing "need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial
trial,"'164 Mr. Justice Brennan proceeded to demand almost all
the elements of one.' 65 This seemed all the more portentous in a
setting where the statute accorded a terminated welfare recipient
what was admittedly an adequate hearing within ten working
days after a request and a decision within twelve working days
thereafter. 166 The Court has not had subsequent occasion to
consider what Chief Justice Burger called "intriguing possibilities
concerning the right to a hearing at other stages in the welfare
process which affect the total sum of assistance, even though the
action taken might fall short of complete termination ... [such
as] welfare reductions or denial of increases . . . , or decisions
concerning initial applications or requests for special assistance."'167 But the effect on the lower courts of Goldberg, in conhowever, that the procedures required by today's decision for the deprivation of good
time would also be required for the imposition of lesser penalties such as the loss of
privileges."); Newkirk v.Butler, 499 F.2d 1214 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 172 (1974)
(prisoner who was transferred from a medium to maximum security prison on basis of
rumor he was about to become involved in trouble concerning the formation of an
inmate union is entitled to prior notice and a hearing); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F.
Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla.), vacated, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992
(1974) (procedures required for revocation of "good time" credits, or solitary confinement, contrasted with those required for administrative segregation); Rinehart v. Brewer,
360 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974); United States ex
rel. Robinson v. Mancusi, 340 F. Supp. 662 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (informal hearing required
within 72 hours of revocation of certain privileges); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
163397 U.S. 254 (1970).
164Id. at 266.
165 See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.07, at 169-70 (3d ed. 1972). Professor Davis thinks the two omissions noted by him, a verbatim transcript and testimony
under oath, probably have "no significance." This is scarcely true about the former; the
Court in Goldberg deliberately omitted this as serving "primarily to facilitate judicial
review," 397 U.S. at 267, which could hardly occur before the post-termination "fair
hearing."
The statement in the text should also be qualified to the extent that the Goldberg
opinion is rather vague about the claimant's right to call witnesses. This right may or may
not be included within the phrase "by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally." 397 U.S. at 268. And clearly there is no mention of compulsory process.
166397 U.S. at 259-60 n.5. However, "[I]t
was conceded at oral argument that these
time limits are not in fact observed." Id.
167 Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1970) (dissenting opinion). But see
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 169 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 201-02
(White, J., concurring & dissenting). As indicated in note 51 supra, this has been due to
the fact that federal and state statutes and regulations have generally provided pro
cedural protections for claimants at almost all stages of the welfare process, exceeding
those mandated by Goldberg with respect to the termination of assistance, even when the
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junction with subsequent Supreme Court decisions, on the lower
courts has been profound. The trend in one area after another
has been to say, "If there, why not here?"1 68 And "[t]he tendency
of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic" has not
been much counteracted, as Cardozo expected, "by the tendency
deprivations involved are less serious. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1974) (federal regulations governing state "fair hearings" with respect to AFDC grants, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10,
620-26, 630-44 (1970); id. §§ 1396a-1396i (Medicaid Programs); 20 C.F.R. § 416 (1974)
(governing hearing requirements and procedures for all adult welfare assistance programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (1970) (Old Age Assistance); id. §§ 1201-06 (Aid to the
Blind); id. §§ 1351-55 (Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled); id. §§ 1381-85 (Aid
to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled)); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358.16 (1974) (prescribing details of
federally mandated "fair hearings" in New York); id. § 358.4(a)-(c) (1974) (hearing protection for recipients of food stamps, cash assistance benefits, and social services in New
York); Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 859, 927-40 (1974). However, this situation may not continue.
16 See, e.g., in addition to decisions already canvassed: (1) Termination of social
security benefits: Williams v. Weinberger, 494 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir.), petitionJor cert. filed,
43 U.S.L.W. 3175 (U.S. Sept. 8, 1974) (No. 74-205); Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F.
Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973), affd per curiam, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 773 (1975). See also Meyerhoff & Mishkin, Application of Goldberg v. Kelly
HearingRequirements to Termination of Social Security Benefits, 26 STAN. L. REV. 549 (1974).
(2) Eviction of tenants from public housing: Brown v. Housing Auth., 471 F.2d 63
(7th Cir.), affg 340 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (applying HUD regulations and thus
not reaching constitutional holding of district court). Rejection of an applicant for public
housing: Neddo v. Housing Auth., 355 F. Stipp. 1397 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Davis v. Toledo
Metro. Housing Auth., 311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970). But see Sumpter v. White
Plains Housing Auth., 329 N.Y.2d 420, 278 N.E.2d 892, 328 N.Y.S.2d 649, cert. denied,
406 U.S. 928 (1972) (informal interview only requirement). See also Spady v. Mount
Herman Housing Auth., 95 S. Ct. 243 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from a denial of
certiorari). Eviction of tenants from govern ment-subsidized or -financed housing:
Caramico v. Secretary of the Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.
1974) (notice of proposed action and grounds; tenant may submit and "support
with evidence" any considerations he wishes the Secretary to take into account before reaching final determination; explicit decision of any ground which is disputed,
including a statement of opposing considerations, "that adequately disposes of the
issue"); Wilson v. Lincoln Redev. Corp., 488 F.2d 339, 342 n.7 (8th Cir. 1973) (informal
hearing only requirement of due process); Bonner v. Park Lake Housing Dev. Fund
Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 325, 330, 333 N.Y.S.2d 277, 282 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (informal conference). Rent increases in public housing: Burr v. New Rochelle Munic. Housing Auth.,
479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973) (flexible "hearing" requirement). But see Langevin v.
Chenango Ct., Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st
Cir. 1970). See also Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 235 (1974) (tenants in public housing constructed tinder National Housing Act,
12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-50 (1970), have statutory right "to be heard" prior to rent increases);
Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (tenants in government-subsidized
low-income housing have similar statutory right to participate in official consideration of
rent increases by written submissions).
(3) Transfer of a civilly committed patient from a mental hospital to a prison because of alleged dangerous propensities. Romero v. Schaver, 386 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo.
1974).
(4) Discontinuance of medicare benefits: Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121
(10th Cir. 1973).
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to confine itself within the limits of its history."' 6 9 However, the
mechanical application of Goldberg, indeed some portions of that
decision itself, will now have to be reconsidered in light of Wolff
70
and of Arnett v. Kennedy.'
The spread of Goldberg has posed another problem. The
complaining party in an action under the Civil Rights Act,171 be
he welfare recipient, dismissed teacher, displaced tenant, or aggrieved prisoner, normally will complain of denial not of a single
procedural safeguard but of several. The complainant in the
next case will raise still other points. A federal district judge,
being thus placed in a situation where he is gradually evolving a
code of administrative procedure for the particular subject, is
sorely tempted to make an end to it and to promulgate procedural rules covering all the problems that he can foresee in a
72
particular area.
Although something is to be said for doing this, I regard the
tendency as unfortunate in most areas of mass justice, particularly for inferior courts. The Chief Justice was right when he
asked whether it would not be wiser "to hold the heavy hand of
constitutional adjudication and allow evolutionary procedures at
various administrative levels to develop, given their flexibility to
169 B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

51 (1921).
416 U.S. 134 (1974).
17142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
'17 The notable early opinion in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150
(5th Cir.) (Rives, J.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), did substantially this in its analysis
of the constitutional constraints limiting the discretion of administrators to expel students
from public colleges; however, the opinion was as much concerned with pointing out
what was not required as in developing what was. Another interesting pre-Goldberg example, which, in endeavoring to eliminate the possibility of conflicting decisions by
judges in the same district, illustrates the essentially legislative character of such judgments, can be found in the rules promulgated by the judges for the Western District of
Missouri with respect to student discipline in tax-supported institutions, General Order
on Judicial Standards of Procedure & Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax
Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (1969). For a recent decision
developing elaborate standards of procedural protection for varying types of prison
discipline, see Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla.), vacated, 491 F.2d 417
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992 (1974). An extremely detailed piece of legislation with respect to civil commitment was developed in Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378
(M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court, with one judge dissenting). A contrary attitude,
favoring case-by-case adjudication by federal courts and leaving it to the states to develop
their own procedures, is illustrated by United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d
701 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974). The Seventh Circuit, speaking
through Judge Stevens, over the partial dissent of Chief Judge Swygert, cited with approval Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 197 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972), in which Judge Kaufman had said:
We would not presume to fashion a constitutional harness of nothing more than
our guesses. It would be mere speculation for us to decree that the effect of
17-
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make adjustments in procedure without long delays."'
Judge Learned Hand wisely said,

73

As

Constitutions are deliberately made difficult of amendment; mistaken readings of them cannot be readily corrected. Moreover, if they could be, constitutions must
not degenerate into vade mecums or codes; when they
begin to do so, it is a sign of a community unsure of
itself and
seeking protection against its own misgiv74
ings.'
Courts are good at deciding cases, bad at drafting legislation;
typically they see the case at hand and a few others but not the
entire spectrum. If federal judges impose a code upon a state,
every claim of breach is the basis for a suit under the Civil Rights
Act. Furthermore, there is no single correct solution for most of
the problems here considered; as previously suggested, more of
one procedural safeguard may justify less of another.' 7 5 Experience has shown the wisdom of Mr. Justice Harlan's observation,
"I seriously doubt the wisdom of these 'guideline' decisions.
They suffer the danger of pitfalls that usually go with judging in
a vacuum. However carefully written, they are apt in their application to carry unintended consequences which once accom76
plished are not always easy to repair."'
Beyond this there is an institutional difficulty. One can readily imagine how different administrative codes would be as written by each of the twenty-seven judges of the Southern District
of New York; much would depend on the luck of the draw.
Appellate resolution of the grant or denial of a right claimed in a
particular case is appropriate enough, but reviewing courts
should not have to rework codes developed by district judges
relating to points not directly at issue. This process would be
painfully lengthy and indirect, and future code amendments
equipping prisoners with more elaborate constitutional weapons against the administration of discipline by prison authorities would be more soothing to the
prison atmosphere and rehabilitative of the prisoner or, on the other hand,
more disquieting and destructive of remedial ends. This is ajudgment entrusted
to state officials, not federal judges.
479 F.2d at 717 (footnote omitted).
172 Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 283 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
174 L. HAND, The Contibution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SPIRIT
OF LIBERTY 162 (I. Dilliard 3d ed. 1960).
175 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
176 Sanders v.United States, 373 U.S. 1, 32 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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from new perceptions or reevaluations would be most difficult to
make. Legislation should generally be left to the states or, when
appropriate, to Congress and federal agencies.
It is unfortunate that, five years after Goldberg, we have so
little empirical knowledge how it has worked in its own field, let
alone in others where its principles have been applied. For one
thing, one would wish to know whether the procedural safeguards that Goldberg required have really been applied, and, if
not, whether the failure has been due to bureaucratic obduracy
or to basic impracticability. 1 77 One would wish also to know the
costs, both of administrative expenses that would not otherwise
have been incurred and of continuation of unjustified
payments, 17 8 in relation to the benefits of injustices prevented.
This is not to suggest that benefits can be precisely quantified in
dollar terms or that some excess of the costs would call for reconsideration of the required procedures. As Mr. Justice Brennan
has rightly said, administrative fairness usually does entail "some
additional administrative burdens and expense."' 79 But if the
excess of costs over estimated benefits were, say, four-fold, with
the concomitant likelihood that, in the Chief Justice's words,
"new layers of procedural protection may become an intolerable
drain on the very funds earmarked for food, clothing, and other
living essentials,"' 8 0 one would at least wish to examine whether

17- A 1972 study of fair hearing procedures as practiced by the New York City Public
Welfare Agencies, Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication o/ Social
Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 813-14 (1974), found that a procedurally regular
hearing had not been provided in a significant number of cases: (1) 5% of the appellants
received no notice of proposed adverse action; (2) 25% did not receive timely notice; (3)
two-thirds failed to receive an adequate statement of what was proposed and the factual
and policy reasons therefor, (4) in 15% of the cases aid had not been continued pending
appeal; (5) only 25% of the applicants requesting access to agency files were granted
such access; (6) in only 7% of the cases was an opportunity for cross-examination provided by having witnesses present. The restlts of a study by D. Kirchheimer, Community
Evaluation of Fair Hearing Procedures Available to Public Assistance Recipients 5, 6
(1973) (on file at New York City Human Resources Administration), seem to comport
with a 1969 research project which, using survey questionnaire methodology, examined
the attitudes of social workers toward administrative hearings and found that a substantial portion of these individuals had negative feelings concerning the relative utility of
providing hearings. See Scott, The Reality of ProceduralDue Process-A Study of the Implementation of Fair Hemng Requirements by the Welfare Caseworker, 13 WXi. & MARY L. REV. 725
(1972).
'1 See note 54 supra.
17' Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 205, 227 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"80 Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 284 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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it would not be possible to devise some less cumbersome but
nevertheless fair procedures.1 8 1
When we move to the category in which government is
merely refusing an application for a benefit, the atmosphere is
quite different. To be sure, due process prevents an agency from
using impermissible standards' 8 2 or from abdicating its function.183 Similarly, due process may require a trial-type hearing
on a claim of eligibility when the consequences of a refusal are
serious.' 84 But to my knowledge no court has held that an unsuccessful applicant for admission to the bar is entitled to a trialtype hearing on the grading of his examination paper; 8 5 that an
unsuccessful applicant for admission to a state university with a
limited number of places is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
with respect to his turn-down; 1 86 or that a person on the waiting
list for public housing is entitled to such a hearing on a claim
that a later applicant has been preferred.
181 While cost-benefit analyses are not so readily made in other fields, the need for
empirical studies is great. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 197 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) ("We are particularly unwilling to interfere
with state administrative processes when reliable, detailed information or empirical
studies are as scanty as they are on the subject of prison disciplinary procedures").
182 See, e.g., Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973). See also
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333
(2d Cir. 1973).
183 This was the situation in the well-known case of Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605
(5th Cir. 1964). The Mayor and Aldermen of Atlanta had granted liquor licenses under a

system of "ward courtesy" whereby licenses were issued only after approval by one or

both of the aldermen of the ward in which the establishment was to be located. The
opinion instructed the district court to enjoin the denial of licenses under that system if it
found that no ascertainable standards had in fact been developed by the board by which
an applicant "can intelligently seek to qualify for a license ... until a legal standard is
established and procedural due process provided in the liquor store licensing field," id. at
612. However, the opinion did not clarify the content of this standard. It is hard to
believe that the court thought eligible applicants competing for a single license were
constitutionally entitled to "comparative hearings" such as those provided by statute in
FCC proceedings.
84 See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (holding that petitioner was clearly entitled to notice and a hearing-including confrontation
and cross-examination-on the grounds for the denial of admission to the bar). See also
Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961). The same reasoning should
apply to an application for welfare benefits in which, typically, the only issue is eligibility.
Compare the principle that an alien seeking suspension of a valid deportation order is
entitled to a hearing on eligibility but not on the exercise of discretion to suspend
deportation. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
185 See Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974).
186 Except, of course, when the charge is invidious discrimination on the grounds of
race, religion, or sex. See generally Avins v. Rutgers, The State Univ., 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968) (author of law review article not entitled to a
hearing to show that editors' refusal to publish was due to dislike of author's views).
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V. HEARING REQUIREMENTS FOR RULEMAKING
In the area of rulemaking the FloridaEast Coast'8 7 decision
stands in sharp contrast to the broadened rights to a hearing we
have been reviewing. Since the case is not exactly a household
term, indeed remains largely unknown except to the cognoscenti, a short statement of the facts is in order.
In 1917 Congress amended the Interstate Commerce Act to
endow the ICC with power "after hearing" to establish reasonable "rules, regulations and practices" with respect to freight car
service, including the compensation to be paid by one railroad
for using the cars of another. 8 8 In fixing such compensation the
Commission generally accorded a full trial-type hearing. 189 In an
effort to deal with shortages of freight cars, Congress enacted a
further amendment in 1966190 empowering the Commission to
add a penalty, euphemistically described as "an incentive element," to fair compensation for the use of freight cars found to
be in inadequate supply.
The legislative history of the amendment indicated congressional belief that "full hearings" would be accorded, 19 1 and so
the Commission seems to have thought.' 92 Ultimately, responding to congressional pressure for action, the Commission took a
shortcut, according the right to file written statements of fact
and position concerning a proposed schedule of charges but denying an oral hearing in the absence of a request showing "with
1 93
specificity the need therefor and the evidence to be adduced."'
The Commission denied all such requests. 194 When two southern
carriers attacked the order on the ground that the Administrative Procedure Act' 9 5 and the "hearing" provision of the Inter187 United States v. Florida E.G. Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). See text accompanying
note 31 supra.
188Act of May 29, 1917, ch. 23, 40 Stat. 101, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
89 See, e.g., the order invalidated because of lack of thorough investigation and
detailed findings in Boston & M.R.R. v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 289 (D. Mass.)
(three-judge court), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 68 (1958).
190Act of May 26, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-430, § 1, 80 Stat. 168 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §
1(14)(a) (1970)).
171 See 112 CONe. REC. 10443 (1966) (remarks of Representative Staggers).
102 See United States v. Florida E.G. Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 254-55 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Incentive Per Diem Charges-1968, 337 I.C.C. 217, 219 (1970) (parties accorded "a hearing under section 556" of the APA in connection with ICC consideration
of incentive charges).
193Incentive Per Diem Charges-1968, 337 I.C.C. 183, 213 (1969).
194United States v.Florida E.C. Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 234 (1973).
1955 U.S.C. § 556 (1970).
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state Commerce Act' 96 required opportunity for greater participation by parties, the Supreme Court, reversing a lower court
decision in their favor, 1 97 upheld the order on the ground that
the Commission had simply engaged in rulemaking. For
rulemaking, governed by 5 U.S.C. section 553(c) rather than
section 556 unless the rules were "required by statute to be made
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," the
opportunity to submit written comments was sufficient participation.
If the case stood only for the proposition that the provision
of the APA requiring trial-type procedures when rules, in the
ordinary sense of that term, "are required by statute to be made
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing" should
be limited to the few statutes that used these words or something
very much like them, the decision would be of relatively little
moment. 98 Indeed, as the judge who had the misfortune of
having to write a lengthy and difficult opinion in a case where
the statute did require this,' 99 I would look with special favor on
a development that prevented a spread of the infection of full
196 49 U.S.C. § l(14)(a) (1970).
197 Florida E.C. Ry. v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Fla. 1971) (three-judge
court).
In Long Island R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (three-judge
court), the court, in an opinion by the writer, had also held that the statute contemplated
a trial-type hearing but dismissed the complaint on the ground that the Long Island had
not shown that it would be prejudiced by denial of an oral hearing, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)
(1970). The decision was not appealed.
198In the wake of FloridaEast Coast lower courts have been naturally hesitant to find
a requirement of the more formal procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1970), which are
imposed when rules are required by statute to be made "on the record." In Mobil Oil
Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court deemed the words "on the
record" to be the "touchstone test" for imposing all of the trial-type requirements of that
section. See also Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974); Duquesne Light Co.
v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 6 n.26 (3d Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615, 630 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural
Requirementsfor Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REV. 782, 795 (1974).
199National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 135 (1975). That case included 15 petitions for review of two final regulations of
the FDA prescribing label requirements and standards of identity for vitamins and minerals, promulgated under authority of 21 U.S.C. §§ 341, 3430) (1970). The agency
hearing transcript comprised more than 32,000 pages and the material sent us, consisting
of selected portions of the record, filled three feet of shelf space. The use of trial-type
procedures had been of little avail; cross-examination of government witnesses, which
filled some 60% of the pages devoted to the Government's presentation, yielded precious
few admissions or other statements of any significance. Ironically, the hearing examiner
had denied cross-examination in the one instance where it might have been most useful.
504 F.2d at 792-99.
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trial-type hearings to the sort of rulemaking that is predominantly a determination of policy.
However, the sweep of the FloridaEast Coast decision goes
far beyond that. The opinion seems to say that "hearing" provisions in regulatory statutes, which had long been regarded as
requiring trial-type hearings, have been modified by the Administrative Procedure Act so that nothing more than notice and
written comment is required if the action falls within the APA's
expansive definition of rulemaking,2 0 0 and implicitly, of course,
that this comports with due process. 20 1 The definition of
rulemaking is exceedingly broad, about the only limitation being
that a rule can have only future effect. 20 2 Although the Florida

East Coast opinion noted that the incentive payments "were applicable across the board to all of the common carriers by railroad subject to the Interstate Commerce Act,120 3 the APA definition of "rule" refers to a "statement of general or particular applicability, '20 4 and one can hardly believe Mr. Justice Rehnquist's decision would have been different if the Commission had
used its power to exempt certain railroads from payment of
incentive per diem charges.
200 To be sure, Justice Rehnquist makes a point of the fact that the action under
review in the FloridaEast Coast case was taken pursuant to a post-APA amendment of the
Interstate Commerce Act. 410 U.S. at 240-41 & n.8. But the 1966 amendment to § 1(14)
was substantive, not procedural, and history showed that both Congress and the Commission intended previous procedures to continue. See notes 191-92 supra. The "after hearing" language has been a part of the statute since the Esch Car Service Act was enacted in
1917. Act of May 29, 1917, ch. 23, 40 Stat. 101, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
201 Mr. Justice Douglas found this modification more than just implicit, see 410 U.S.
at 246-47.
202 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)-(5). Section 551(4) reads:
"rule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of
an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates,
wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices,
facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or
accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing ....
Justice Rehnquist noted that the order in Florida East Coast was "basically [a] legislativetype judgment, for prospective application only." 410 U.S. at 246.
203 410 U.S. at 246.
204 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970) (emphasis added). Drawing on the legislative history,
Professor Davis says, "The words 'or particular' were not intended to change into rule
making what before the Act was regarded as adjudication. Those words mean no more
than that what is otherwise rule making does not become adjudication merely because it
applies only to particular parties or to a particular situation." 1 DAVIS, supra note 5, §
5.02, at 296 (1958) (footnote omitted). One could as well say "no less." See, e.g., Anaconda
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973) (promulgation of standard limiting
sulfur dioxide which affected only one polluter properly handled as rulemaking).
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The FloridaEast Coast decision thus signals a large expansion
of what can be done by notice and comment rulemaking and a
corresponding retraction of the area where a trial-type hearing is
required in the regulatory field. A clear example would be the
division of joint rates, a subject closely akin to charges for car
hire. In The New England Divisions Case20 5 Justice Brandeis took
great pains to justify the Commission's action, pursuant to section 15(6) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 20 6 in fixing divisions
on a regional basis to assist the New England lines in the face of
an argument by other roads that the Commission was obliged to
consider divisions among carriers on an individual basis. Characterizing the proceeding as "adjudication, ' 20 7 he described the
lengthy hearings and extensive evidence received by the Commission in satisfaction of the "full hearing" requirement of the
statute. 20 8 If the Commission today were to think it desirable to
increase divisions for the beleaguered roads in the Northeast,
FloridaEast Coast seems to say that notice and comment rulemaking might suffice.
Still more important is ratemaking, the approval or prescription of which is specifically incorporated in the APA definition of a rule. Why would not the order of the Secretary of
Agriculture fixing future rates for fifty stockyard agencies in
Kansas City, which was before the Court in Morgan JJ,209 now
constitute rulemaking subject only to notice and comment procedures unless it matters that the pertinent statute spoke of a
"full hearing" rather than simply a hearing?210 The Florida East
Coast majority, although unwilling to commit itself, evidently
thinks it might be . 2 1l Indeed why would not a future rate order
205261 U.S. 184 (1923).
26 49 U.S.C. § 15(6) (1970).
207 261 U.S. at 197.
208 Id. at 200. Although Mr. Justice Brandeis concluded "[t]hat there is no constitutional obstacle to the adoption of the method pursued . ..," id. at 199, i.e., the use of
evidence of typical conditions, subject to later adjustment, rather than evidence respecting each combination of railroads for which divisions were necessary, one does not get
the impression that he would have thought a mere notice and comment procedure
constituted due process.
29 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
2"" The Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 21 l(a) (1970), permitted the Secretary to prescribe 'just and reasonable ... rates" for stockyard services after "full hearing."
211 Mr. Justice Rehnquist was not prepared in Florida East Coast to contend that a
"hearing" under 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1970) and a "full hearing" under the Packers and
Stockyards Act would necessarily involve the same procedural requirements. 410 U.S. at
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like that in ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. ,212 which was held to
have required a trial-type hearing, now constitute rulemaking
which can be effectuated by mere notice and comment, since a
rule is nonetheless a rule despite its "particular applicability"?
Although the FloridaEast Coast majority sought to distinguish the
Louisville & Nashville situation by calling it adjudication rather
than rulemaking, 2 13 the distinction did not carry much conviction to the dissenters, 14 nor does it to me.21 5
Hard-pressed agencies will not be slow to draw such lessons
from the FloridaEast Coast decision. 21 6 I am not saying that, from
a policy standpoint, this development is bad; I am saying that it
is quite as revolutionary in the sense of retracting what had been
thought to be procedural rights as Goldberg was in advancing
them. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, was
accurate when he began his dissent by saying, "The present decision marks a sharp break with traditional concepts of procedural
21 7
due process.
The Court is going to have to engage in more hard thinking
about the location of what Justice Rehnquist conceded to be the
not very bright line "between proceedings for the purpose of
promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand,
and proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particu243. This difference may be of considerable practical significance. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §
15(1) (1970) (according to parties a right to a "full hearing" before rail freight rates may
be set aside as unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory and new rates prescribed by the
ICC); 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970) (providing for a "full hearing" in connection with FCC
consideration of applications for a broadcast license). But query whether the members of
Congress over the years have had any idea that the adjective was more than hortatory or
that they were producing a different result when they required only a "hearing," as, for
example, in §§ 4(e) and 5(a) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c & d (1970), rather
than a "full hearing." See also note 233 infra.
212 227 U.S. 88 (1913). See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
213 410 U.S. at 244. It would clearly seem to follow from Florida East Coast that to
such extent as there is a due process right to a hearing with respect to rent increases in
public or publicly assisted housing, notice and opportunity for comment would suffice.
Cf. note 168 supra.
214 410 U.S. at 253-54.
21. See Long Island R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
216 Taking its cue from the reasoning of United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel
Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972), the Tenth Circuit approved an area rate-making order of the
Federal Power Commission promulgated after implementation of new procedures which
"drastically changed the procedure from the traditional method involving trial-type adjudicatory proceedings" to informal conferences and staff investigation and analysis.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1146 (1974). See also Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974).
217 410 U.S. at 246.
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lar cases on the other. '2 18 The line becomes especially difficult to
draw in ratemaking. The process in fixing a future rate for a
single power company or for a particular rail movement is much
more like the process in determining the reasonableness of past
rates 2 19 than the process in setting nationwide safety standards
or in prescribing rules for solicitation of proxies. Much more
than that, since even in rulemaking that is predominantly of the
policy type, there may be subsidiary issues on which notice-andcomment procedures will not always assure fair agency decisionmaking and permit meaningful judicial review, it may be
doubted that they will inevitably fill the statutory or constitutional bill.
This point has already become a subject of much controversy among the judges of the District of Columbia Circuit.
This is a court of special importance for administrative law because, in addition to its exclusive jurisdiction over FCC licensing
decisions and actions of the Environmental Protection Agency as
to emission standards under the Clean Air Act, 220 it is an optional venue under a flock of regulatory statutes and has attracted-doubtless to the delight of the other circuits-the
largest share of environmental litigation and review of orders of
218

410 U.S. at 245.

Presumably the Florida East Coast majority did not mean to call in question the
holdings in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), followed in summary per
curiam reversals in Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (1951), and Riss & Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951), that although the adjudication section of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §
554(a) (1970), also uses the phrase "required by statute to be determined on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing," APA adjudication procedures must be applied
whenever the action was adjudication within 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6)-(7) (1970) and it is the
Constitution rather than a statute which compels a "hearing." However, the failure of the
FloridaEast Coast opinion to deal with this problem could well produce litigation over the
continued vitality and applicability of Wong Yang Sung. If the "required by statute to be
determined on the record" language reads only on the few statutes using the words
recognized as magical in Florida East Coast, why would not the Constitution rather than
the APA supply the sole guide as to proper adjudicative procedure? And this scarcely
would include all the APA safeguards. The lack of discussion of the "to be determined on
the record" language in Wong Yang Sung has always been puzzling. Perhaps Mr. Justice
Jackson was relying on the conclusion in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 42 (1947) that adjudication is always

"on the record."
219 In Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 233 U.S. 479, 486 (1914),
after insisting on the importance of the past-future distinction, the Court sensibly observed that "testimony showing the unreasonableness of a past rate may also furnish
information on which to fix a reasonable future rate and both subjects can be, and often
are, disposed of by the same order." See FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES 8-11 (1962).
220

42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (1970).
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the Federal Power Commission fixing natural gas rates. The
court had savored its role, explaining that "[w]e stand on the
threshold of a new era in the history of the long and fruitful1
22
collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts.
But now the judges are not so sure what this brave new world is
to be. In an opinion handed down only three weeks after the
FloridaEast Coast decision but obviously well on the way to completion before then, Judge Leventhal said in dictum that even in
an environmental rulemaking proceeding "a right of crossexamination, consistent with time limitations, might well extend
to particular cases of need, on critical points where the general
procedure proved inadequate to probe 'soft' and sensitive subjects and witnesses. "222 Chief Judge Bazelon, although disagreeing in some particulars, also believed that his insistence that
"the agency [provide] 'a framework for principled decisionmaking' ",223 might mean that, in some environmental cases, the
"critical character" of the decision "requires at the least a carefully limited right of cross-examination at the hearing .... 24
Shortly thereafter Judge Wilkey joined by Judge Leventhal and
District Judge Jameson of Montana set aside a gas rate order of
the FPC on the ground that the statutory requirement of substantial evidence to support the minimum rate order demanded
more than notice and comment procedures. Judge Wilkey's
opinion put the court squarely on record in favor of a "flexible
interpretation of the APA" and against "forcing the problem
into the artificial cubbyholes of 'informal' versus 'formal.' "225
221 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (Bazelon, C.J.). See Portland Cement Ass'n v.Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) ("the court and agency are in a kind of
partnership relationship.. .") (Leventhal, J.); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA,
465 F.2d 528, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (courts "as... partner[s] in the overall administrative
process") (Leventhal, J.). There is little doubt who is considered to be the senior partner.
222 International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
223

Id.

at 651 (concurring opinion). This phrase comes from the concluding para-

graph of his opinion in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584,
598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
224 International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651-52 (concurring
opinion). The difference of opinion between the two judges again surfaced in a rate case,
Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 487 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 964
(1974), where Judge Bazelon, with the concurrence of a district judge, went further in
requiring a sufficient justification than Judge Leventhal believed proper.
225 Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court said, id.

at 1260:
Informal comments simply cannot create a record that satisfies the substantial evidence test. Even if controverting information is submitted in the form of
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Judge J. Skelly Wright, who had the bad luck not to have been
on the panels that rendered these and other important decisions
on the subject, has taken to the law reviews to upbraid his colleagues for what he terms their "'ad hoc' approach to procedural review" of rulemaking, contrary in his view to the clear
command of the APA and in no way justified under the due
22 6
process clause.
As always, Judge Wright's argument is forceful. One would
not gather from a reading of section 553227 alone that courts
were free to impose procedures for rulemaking more stringent
than those prescribed by Congress. Beyond that, an agency
ought to know in advance how to proceed when promulgating a
"rule" and not have to risk reversal and remand because a reviewing court decides that something more was needed in the
particular case-with attendant expense and delay. 2 28 What
Judge Wright thinks would be the "completely predictable" adcomments by adverse parties, the procedure employed cannot be relied upon as
adequate. A "whole record," as that phrase is used in this context, does not
consist merely of the raw data introduced by the parties. It includes the process
of testing and illumination ordinarily associated with adversary, adjudicative
procedures. Without this critical element, informal comments, even by adverse
parties, are two halves that do not make a whole. Thus, it is adversary procedural devices which permit testing and elucidation that raise information from
the level of mere inconsistent data to evidence "substantial" enough to support
rates.
The opinion sought to distinguish Florida East Coast on the ground that the Interstate
Commerce Act does not contain the substantial evidence language included in later
statutes like the Natural Gas Act. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970). 483 F.2d at 1260-61 nn.83
& 84. This is scarcely a persuasive point in light of the long history of substantial evidence review of ICC orders. The court disagreed with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475
F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1973), believing that Judge Seth's dissenting opinion in that case was
more persuasive. 483 F.2d at 1262. See note 216 supra.
226 Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 384 (1974). For other decisions condemned, see id. at 384
nn.39-42.
At long last Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 43 U.S.L.W. 2334 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 28, 1975), gave
Judge Wright an opportunity for judicial expression of his views; predictably, in light of
his article, he disagreed with Judge Wilkey's reversal of an order of the Environmental
Protection Agency.
227 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
228 The costs of delay are enormous. A paper, Future Energy Requirements: Capital
Productivity and Capital Costs, submitted by Jerome S. Katzin and George J. Konomos of
Kuhn, Loeb & Co. at the New York City hearings of the Federal Ehergy Administration
on Project Independence, August 19-22, 1974, demonstrated that the cost of a $600
million 1200 megawatt nuclear generating plant, assuming a 12% cost of money and an
8% inflation factor, would be $1,336,000,000 if the plant took 10 years to construct as
against $981 million if the plant could be finished in six. Schedule I. For all electric
generating projects planned for the single year 1980, a 20% reduction in the period of
construction would save $3.1 billion on the same assumptions. Schedule IV.
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ministrative response to the ad hoc approach, namely, for the
agency to clothe its action "in the full wardrobe of adjudicatory
procedure" in every case in order to avoid the risk of reversal in
some, 2 29 would be equally bad.
A judge not in the arena must wonder whether the war
Judge Wright is waging with his colleagues is not in some degree
semantic. He emphasizes that agency action is subject to substantive review, whether because of the particular statute or the
APA, 230 on a standard either of substantial evidence or at least of
arbitrariness or capriciousness. 23 1 Although the substantial evidence requirement of the APA applies only in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 "or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute, ' 232 it is arguable that, even
as regards rulemaking, the latter phrase is not limited to the few
cases where the statute expressly requires a determination "on
the record" after opportunity for an agency hearing.2 33 Apart
from this, many recent statutes apply the substantial evidence
test to judicial review of rulemaking. 23 4 Furthermore, the degree
of difference between the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary and capricious test can readily be exaggerated. 3 One can
hardly quarrel with the conclusion that if a reviewing court finds
that the procedures followed by the agency in adopting a rule
have not produced a body of evidence enabling it to pronounce
Wright, supra note 226, at 395.
5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 706 (1970).
231Wright, supra note 226, at 390.
232 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
233See Judge Wilkey's argument in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1258-59
(D.C. Cir. 1973), based on the statutory requirement for agency transmission of a transcript of the record, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970), and the concession in U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 33-34
(1947), that rate orders under the Interstate Commerce Act and the Packers and Stockyards Act must be regarded as "required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing."
234 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2060 (Supp. III, 1973), and
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970).
23- See Associated Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50
(2d Cir. 1973), and authorities there cited. For a contrary view on the significance of the
difference with respect to licensing see Bowman Transp., Inc. v.Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 95 S. Ct. 438, 441-42 (1974), and Judge Wright's opinion in Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 43 U.S.L.W. 2334, 2335 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 28, 1975) ("arbitrary and capricious" is an
"undemanding" standard). But see National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, No.
74-1738 (2d Cir., Feb. 3, 1975), in which the court remanded for a further evaluation of
the adequacy of the record to support the agency's action.Judge Lumbard, concurring,
expressed his view that when an agency engages in substantive rulemaking, the arbitrary
and capricious and substantial evidence standards are identical. Id. at 1623-24.
229

230
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the required benediction, the court must remand. 236 In other
words, while Judge Wilkey's general condemnation of notice and
comment procedure as applied to ratemaking 2 37 may have been
too broad, he very likely reached the proper result in the case
2
before him.

38

It is thus not too consequential whether a court invalidates a
rule on the ground that the procedures have not developed substantial evidence to support it or even evidence adequate to
rebut a claim that it is arbitrary and capricious, or, instead, takes
the route of prescribing ad hoc procedural requirements in addition to those of section 553. Although the former course seems
more in keeping with the statutory language and less likely to
promote undue judicial activism, the practical result is much the
same. Both roads lead to the conclusion that an administrator
engaged in rulemaking governed by the APA cannot always be
sure that rudimentary notice and comment procedures, even if
239 will
they measure up to Judge Wright's salutary specifications,
always suffice. There will continue to be cases of rulemaking in
which, in order to show that its action is supported by substantial
evidence or even to avoid characterization of its action as "arbitrary and capricious," the agency must provide "some mechanism
for interested parties to introduce adverse evidence and criticize evidence
introduced by others."' 240 Just what mechanism must be provided
will depend on the interests at stake, the complexity of the issue,
and the usefulness of the particular mechanism as weighed
against its adverse effects. 4 1 In most cases the rulemaking pro226See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1973): "The procedures followed in this case.., have resulted in a record that leaves this
court uncertain, at a minimum, whether the essentials of the intention of Congress were
achieved. This requires a remand whereby the record as made will be supplemented by
further proceedings."
2317See note 225 supra.

238 This seems to be Chief Judge Bazelon's approach in Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC,
487 F.2d 1043, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 964 (1974).
239 Wright, supra note 226, at 395.
240 Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasis in
original). See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-401 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), the reasoning of which Judge Wright seems to
find compatible with his formulation of the proper role of judicial review in this area,
Wright, supra note 226, at 380 n.17, 381 n.22. See also South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504
F.2d 646, 662 (1st Cir. 1974), holding that notice and comment rulemaking was proper
but remanding a particular issue for receipt and consideration of further arguments.
241The Administrative Conference of the United States has been considering
whether § 553 requires amendment. See 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 66-67 (1972) (Recommendation
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cedures suggested by Judge Wright should suffice; in a few, with
respect to the same issue, they may not.
In rulemaking also we thus end with a requirement not
much more precise than "some kind of hearing." While Florida
East Coast liberates the agencies from the constraints of full adjudicatory procedures in many cases where these had been
thought required, it is not a license for sloppiness. If reviewing
courts insist that an agency engaged in rulemaking properly advise the parties of the intended action and the grounds and data
thought to support it, afford opportunity for opposing the action or proposing alternatives, and render reasoned decisions,
then the broadened role for "informal" rulemaking adumbrated
by the decision, whether "right" or "wrong" as a matter of precedent, will be a constructive development, avoiding the delays
incident to formal adjudicative procedures in many instances
242
where these are not needed, yet safeguarding the essentials.
VI.

CONCLUSION

With that I bring this long survey to a close. If I have raised
more problems than I have settled, that is the prerogative of a
judge giving a lecture, as distinguished from the certainty seemingly felt by students writing law review notes. We have traveled
over wide areas-from termination of welfare payments to the
establishment of incentive per diem for freight cars, from student and prison discipline to rates for natural gas. 243 Yet the
problem is always the same-to devise procedures that are both
fair and feasible.
72-5; Procedures for Adoption of Rules of General Applicability); Hamilton, Procedures
for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276 (1972). The problem is that the infinite
varieties of rulemaking make it difficult and probably unwise to go beyond a minimal
amount of legislative prescription. For an interesting recent example of the latter, see
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 83 Stat. 2183, tit. II, §§ 201, 202 (1975).
242 For illuminating pre-Florida East Coast discussion, see Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearingsfor Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71
MICH. L. REV. 111 (1972); Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51; Hamilton, supra note
241; Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970).
243 The exercise in breadth has necessarily involved a sacrifice in depth with respect
to particular areas. Happily, one such gap, relating to the FloridaEast Coast case, is about
to be filled in an article by Professor Nathaniel L. Nathanson in a forthcoming issue of
the Columbia Law Review, a draft of which I was privileged to read after I had nearly
completed my own writing.
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In this task we still have far to go. In the mass justice area
the Supreme Court has yielded too readily to the notions that
the adversary system is the only appropriate model and that
there is only one acceptable solution to any problem, and consequently has been too prone to indulge in constitutional codification. There is need for experimentation, particularly for the use
of the investigative model, for empirical studies, and for avoiding absolutes. While the Court has been too rigid in some ways, it
has been too vague in others. Apart from the field of creditors'
preliminary remedies, 2 4 4 the lower courts have been furnished
little in the way of principle that will enable them to decide with
fair assurance as new situations develop. One source of the difficulty has stemmed from the Court's pulling practically all the
procedural stops in Goldberg which, although styled as a welfare
termination, was in fact a suspension under peculiarly necessitous circumstances. All that was really wrong with the New York
procedure was the failure to afford any opportunity for an oral
presentation in situations where claimants often were unable to
state their case in writing and to provide some opportunity for
testing the credibility of tipsters. 2 45 Now Goss v. Lopez has advanced the frontiers of due process without giving any indication
where, if anywhere, the stopping place may be. Meanwhile
Florida East Coast was floated, greatly expanding the area for
notice-and-comment rulemaking without precise explanation of
the decision's effect on prior rulings of the Court, on situations
where the statutory language differed slightly,24 6 and on longheld assumptions of regulated industries and their counsel, or
sufficient consideration of the occasional inadequacies of infor244 This area, not discussed in detail in this Article, is considered to be in a state of
serious disarray by several Justices. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S.
Ct. 719, 726 (1975) (Blackmun, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
245 The opinion of the three-judge court, Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), which was affirmed in Goldberg was much more moderate than the
Supreme Court's. After outlining the rather modest requirements, Judge Feinberg
characterized them as an "informal conference." Id. at 905.
"' For example, does it matter whether a "hearing" statute was pre-APA or postAPA; whether it requires a "hearing" or a "full hearing"; whether it includes a direction
for transmission of the record; whether it contains a substantial evidence clause; whether
a substantial evidence clause is the conventional one making determinations conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence or one directing a court to set the order aside if not
supported by substantial evidence? The Court, or Congress, should move speedily to
clear tip these uncertainties. To my mind such distinctions are trivial; the best course is
to give Florida East Coast a broad application but to recognize that in some cases even the
best notice-and-comment rulemaking may not suffice with respect to some issue.
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mal procedure which had already surfaced. While I applaud the
Court's basic initiatives with respect to administrative hearings,
the time for some new thinking and also for some tidying up has
arrived.

